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Abstract
Inference is the process of using facts we know to learn about facts we do not know. A theory of in-
ference gives assumptions necessary to get from the former to the latter, along with a definition for
and summary of the resulting uncertainty. Any one theory of inference is neither right nor wrong,
but merely an axiom that may or may not be useful. Each of the many diverse theories of inference
can be valuable for certain applications. However, no existing theory of inference addresses the
tendency to choose, from the range of plausible data analysis specifications consistent with prior
evidence, those that inadvertently favor one’s own hypotheses. Since the biases from these choices
are a growing concern across scientific fields, and in a sense the reason the scientific community
was invented in the first place, we introduce a new theory of inference designed to address this crit-
ical problem. We derive “hacking intervals,” which are the range of a summary statistic one may
obtain given a class of possible endogenous manipulations of the data. Hacking intervals require no
appeal to hypothetical data sets drawn from imaginary superpopulations. A scientific result with a
small hacking interval is more robust to researcher manipulation than one with a larger interval, and
is often easier to interpret than a classical confidence interval. Some versions of hacking intervals
turn out to be equivalent to classical confidence intervals, which means they may also provide a
more intuitive and potentially more useful interpretation of classical confidence intervals.
Keywords: Robustness, Replicability, Observational Data, Model Dependence, Causal Inference,
Matching
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1. Introduction
The numerous choices in even “best practice” data analysis procedures lead to high levels of unmea-
sured and unreported uncertainty in research publications. These choices include, among others,
variable selection and transformations, data subsetting, identification and elimination of outliers,
functional forms, distributional assumptions, priors, estimators, nonparametric preprocessing (such
as matching), and procedures to control for unmeasured confounders (such as difference in differ-
ences or instrumental variables). (See Wicherts et al. 2016 for an attempt to enumerate a complete
list.) Classical statistical inference conditions on whichever choices the analyst makes and focuses
on uncertainty induced by observing only one possible sample of data. This is uncertainty across
hypothetical datasets, where one is observed and the rest might have come from an imagined su-
perpopulation. However, within the single observed dataset, the often considerable variation across
potential “plausible” analysis choices can lead to a wide range of empirical estimates, a range that
is often considerably larger than the uncertainty induced by hypothetical sampling.
We thus propose that researchers (and readers) ask a simple question that gets to the heart of
whether or not a quantitative conclusion can be trusted: “Would another honest researcher, choosing
different but still reasonable analysis techniques, come to a different conclusion?” The best way to
answer this question is the very process of science, where numerous researchers work in cooperation
and competition in pursuit of a common goal. If one researcher publishes a result that can be
questioned by another, a healthy scientific community will ensure that will happen and together
with others they will be more likely to find the right answer. But what happens in the interim, when
we write or read a paper today? How do we increase the likelihood that the conclusions in this
paper could not be overturned by minor changes in the analysis methods that another reasonable
researcher might choose? We offer a quantitative framework for answering these questions.
We use the term hacking to describe an earnest researcher working hard to choose appropriately
among many data analysis choices. Although this term is sometimes used to describe dishonest
manipulation of results, we use it solely (in the positive sense of a “hackathon”) to refer to honest
scientists genuinely trying to get the right answer by making analysis choices among many rea-
sonable alternatives. For a given model class and loss function, a hacking interval is the smallest
and largest value of a summary statistic (e.g., a coefficient in a regression, first difference, risk
ratio, or other quantity of interest) that can be achieved over a set of constraints for which the re-
searcher, readers, and the scientific community would like robustness. It quantifies the extent to
which a different, also reasonable, analyst could come to different conclusions. Researchers who
report hacking intervals are being more transparent about the evidence available to support their
hypotheses. Hacking intervals are designed to reveal information any research publication should
provide to make it less likely to mislead researchers and readers of their work. A major benefit of
hacking intervals is that they are easy to understand, interpret, and teach, we think much easier than
introducing hypothetical draws from imaginary superpopulations. They can be taught along side,
before, or even without reference to classical confidence intervals or any other theory of inference.
They do not require knowledge of probability.
The hacking intervals we propose come in two varieties. Prescriptively constrained hacking
intervals allow for an explicit definition of the analysis choices reasonable researchers make and they
identify the range of a summary statistic over these choices. They are useful when one can limit
which analysis choices are valid. The second type, tethered hacking intervals, avoid the explicit
enumeration of analysis choices and require only that the predictive model chosen by the researcher
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has a small enough loss on the observed data. Each type of hacking interval is a consequence of the
defined set of researcher constraints. In a maximum likelihood scenario, tethered hacking intervals
are mathematically equivalent to profile likelihood confidence intervals (as shown in Section 4.2).
Our work therefore provides a new interpretation of profile likelihood confidence intervals that
requires no understanding of probability.
Quantifying the potential impact of hacking is especially — but not only — important if re-
searchers are (inadvertently) biased toward a favored hypothesis. This is crucial since standard data
analysis procedures leave researchers in a situation that meets all the conditions social-psychologists
have identified that lead to biased choices: In the presence of high levels of discretion, many anal-
ysis choices, little objective way to know which is best, and access to the estimates each choice
results in, even honest, hard working, earnest researchers are likely to inadvertently bias results to-
ward their favorite hypotheses (Gilbert, 1998; Banaji and Greenwald, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). If
a researcher (or reader) is concerned that analysis choices were only chosen because they yielded
results consistent with the bias of the researcher, a hacking interval informs them of the degree to
which this can matter. A small hacking interval says that any researcher making choices within our
defined constraints, whether biased towards a conclusion or not, could only have a small impact on
the result. Hacking intervals, defined via specific norms such as the ones we suggest here, are a
natural solution for conveying the impact analysis choices can have for any one publication, with-
out the costly, time consuming, and sometimes dubious or tendentious process of ad hoc sensitivity
testing designed anew for each article. Hacking intervals characterize the space of analysis choices
systematically with precise computational and mathematical tools. This process can also provide
insight into the state of researcher bias in an entire literature: if the hacking interval is large, and the
range of conclusions from many published studies is small, then this suggests researchers may be
collectively biased towards a specific conclusion.
There exist some formalized procedures that aim to mitigate the impact of bias, for example
pre-registration, lists of “best practices,” enforced ignorance (e.g., double blinding experiments and
journal reviews), or requiring replication datasets (King, 1995), but the problem of reasonable re-
searchers being able to reach a different conclusions would still exist even if researchers were each
unbiased. The sheer number of possible analysis choices leaves unchecked uncertainty in scientific
results unless the space of choices is rigorously defined and explored.
Throughout this work, we offer examples and illustrations of hacking intervals, in the context
of k-nearest neighbors (kNN), matching, variable selection, support vector machines, and, in more
detail, linear regression. We present an analysis of recidivism prediction, where we find evidence
that the COMPAS score, which is a commonly used risk scoring system used in bail and parole
decisions, may sometimes be calculated incorrectly. This can lead in practice to dangerous criminals
being released, as well as low risk individuals being unfairly sentenced or denied bail or parole. We
find cases where the COMPAS score is not within the hacking interval, meaning that no reasonable
model or research choice (by our definition of reasonable, and according to our dataset) would agree
with the risk assessment provided by COMPAS.
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2. Theories of Inference
Each of the diverse theories of inference is united by a common goal — to understand if an ob-
served effect is robust over counterfactual worlds imagined to have occurred. These theories can
be distinguished by which set of counterfactual worlds are assumed to be of interest. For example,
p-values consider if an effect is robust to counterfactual data from a superpopulation. Fisher’s exact
p-values fix the data and measure if an effect is robust to counterfactual treatment assignments from
every possible randomization. Causal sensitivity analysis considers if an effect is robust to counter-
factual unmeasured confounders from a defined set (Ding and VanderWeele, 2016; Liu et al., 2013).
Bayesian credible intervals define results as robust to counterfactual worlds, generated by redraw-
ing the data from the same data generating process, given the observed data and assumed prior and
likelihood model.
In part because the sum of uncertainties from different forms of inference is usually too large
to be able to conclude almost anything at all, current practice is to present, in every applied pub-
lication, intervals or another summary from only one chosen form of uncertainty, stemming from
a single theory of inference, and to temporarily assume away other forms of uncertainty. Another
reason for temporarily ignoring all but one form of uncertainty is that one theory of inference may
seem to be of more use than another depending on context. For example, despite studies show-
ing a strong correlation between smoking and lung cancer, the question of whether or not smoking
caused lung cancer was unsettled in the 1950s because of the possibility of an unmeasured con-
founding genetic variable. The Cornfield Conditions assumed that the causal effect was zero and
deduced properties of the unmeasured confounding genetic variable, properties that were deemed
biologically infeasible (Cornfield et al., 1959). This approach to inference was vital to taking the
scientific community from facts that were known (smoking correlates with lung cancer and there
is an approximate biological limit on how much a genetic variable and smoking could be related)
to a fact that was unknown (smoking causes lung cancer). Many other sources of uncertainty also
afflicted this inference, but confounding bias was the largest perceived threat to validity, and so it
was well worth it for researchers to at least temporarily set aside other sources of uncertainty.
We introduce our hacking theory of inference to address the growing crisis in science across
fields, based on the mistrust of published scientific results due to high degrees of researcher discre-
tion. As such, our theory of inference considers if a substantive result is robust to counterfactual
researchers making counterfactual analysis choices from a defined set larger than any one researcher
would normally consider. We try to define this set of analytical decisions based on what all reason-
able researchers from the entire scientific community might choose. Results from our theory of
inference, like all others, is based on a set of counterfactual worlds, but it is designed precisely to
respond to the current concern in the community.
We hypothesize which analysis choices reasonable researchers might make, either by explicitly
constraining their choices or by allowing a tolerance in the loss function. From this, we then de-
duce the range of effects — the hacking interval — of results that would have been found within
these constraints. A hacking interval can therefore be used to judge whether or not the observed
effect is robust to researcher choices. While a hacking interval is designed to estimate the range of
conclusions that reasonable researchers could report, any researcher acting within the constraints
will report results within the hacking interval. Because hacking intervals are designed to character-
ize conservatively all reasonable researcher choices, any researcher should report almost the same
hacking interval.
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An alternative to our approach is a greatly expanded Bayesian model (perhaps via robust Bayes
combined with Bayesian model averaging) that formally specifies all possible modeling decisions,
enables a choice of priors or classes of priors and the many associated hyperprior values over this
large set, and computes classes of posteriors as a result. We do not recommend this approach
because it adds numerous researcher choices for which prior information is rarely available, and thus
may exacerbate the very problem of hacking we seek to address. Our preferred theory of inference
explicitly gives up the goal of full posterior distributions or classes of posterior distributions. In
their place, it seeks the more limited goal of an interval as a summary of uncertainty. What we get
in return for limiting our goal to intervals is clearer ways of specifying assumptions, more effective
ways of limiting researcher discretion, and easy-to-interpret results.
Hacking intervals, classical frequentist confidence intervals, Bayesian credible intervals, and
others each convey important but different components of the strength of evidence in the observed
data. However, hacking intervals may offer an especially natural starting point in analysis and in
teaching. When researchers calculate numerical results of scientific interest, they need to quantify
how strongly the observed data supports their result. As with p-values, classical confidence intervals
quantify the robustness of the result to sampling variability. If the result could be reversed under
different datasets that are likely to have occurred under a specific sampling scheme, the result is not
robust.1 Similarly, if a result could be reversed under different but also reasonable analysis choices,
then the result is not robust. A large interval of either type should be regarded as lack of robustness
of a type. However, hacking intervals may be a more natural starting point. Compared to classic
confidence intervals, hacking intervals:
1. represent uncertainty that always exists,
2. are easier to understand and explain,
3. are natural even when the superpopulation imagined in classical inference is not,
4. are often wider than classical confidence intervals.
On the second point, hacking intervals are the solutions to an optimization problem that requires
no understanding of probability. In contrast, despite repeated clarifications of their interpretation
(Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016), frequentist confidence intervals are routinely misinterpreted and
mis-explained, to the point where they have even been banned in some circles (Trafimow and Marks,
2015) (see Section 7).
In regards to the third point in the above list, consider problems from the political science fields
of comparative politics and international relations, where country level or time-series cross-sectional
data are available. The cause of (for instance) civil wars is deeply important for understanding the
past, and we may like to determine patterns that characterize political situations that have led to
civil wars. One might hypothesize that countries with many people in poverty, having many young
men, with neighboring countries in civil war, and with no strong government could be prone to
have civil wars. The data are observational; randomization is impossible for events that happened
in the past; and no more relevant data may ever be collected (at least until more civil wars of the
same type occur). In situations like these, researchers often use some type of regression to estimate
causal relationships. If the researcher learns that a variable has a large coefficient in the regression
1. Frequentist confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals have precise definitions. We mean this statement
only in regards to their spirit. In a Bayesian context, the observed data is viewed in the context of prior information.
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for predicting aspects relating to a civil war, then she may use confidence intervals to determine
whether this result is robust — robust across possible model specifications. She may use traditional
inference notation (confidence intervals, null hypotheses), but since the idea of a superpopulation
may not even make sense, the null hypothesis does not exist, and she may find it more natural to
compute a hacking interval. Researchers in this field are not interested in constructing an imagi-
nary superpopulation of world systems with different countries; we really only care about the actual
countries and their real civil wars. The question of interest, which hacking intervals address, is
whether the researcher can claim a robust empirical relationship, or whether she demonstrated only
that it was merely possible to find one of a million model specifications that was consistent with her
causal hypothesis. In this case, the researcher may wish to focus on the uncertainty in a hacking in-
terval, rather than a classic confidence interval. However, to do this requires a specific mathematical
framework for this interval, a subject to which we now turn.
Given these four relative advantages of hacking intervals, and that the analyst simply wants to
find patterns in the data that are robust, we recommend that researchers calculate a hacking interval
first and then decide if calculating a classical interval adds value.
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3. Prescriptively-Constrained Hacking Intervals
Denote X ∈ X ⊂ Rn×p as covariates, Y ∈ Y ⊂ Rn×1 as outcomes, Z ∈ Z = X × Y as
datasets, and f : X → Y as prediction functions from a class Fψ, where ψ ∈ Ψ denotes a vector of
hyperparameters. For example,Fψ could be the space of all binary decision trees of maximum depth
ψ. Let L : Z ×Fψ ×Ψ→ R be a loss or regularized loss function, and t : Z ×X ×Fψ → R be a
summary statistic of interest. The loss function may or may not depend on the hyperparametersψ, so
if not we omit writing ψ. Similarly, while the summary statistic must depend on f , it may or may not
depend on Z, which is the observed training data, or X(new), which are covariates for observations
the model is not trained on. Depending on the context we may omit writing Z and/or X(new) in
the definition of t. For hyperparameters ψ, training data Z ∈ Z , and, optionally, test data X(new),
we assume the user finds f∗ that minimizes the loss L(Z, f∗, ψ) and then computes the summary
statistic t∗ := t(Z,X(new), f∗) based on this result. For instance, in linear regression, the user finds
the linear function f∗(x) = xTβ∗ that minimizes the quadratic loss on the dataset Z = [X,y].
Possible summary statistics include an estimate of a single regression coefficient t(f∗) = β∗j , a
goodness-of-fit measurement of f∗ on Z, or a prediction t(x(new), f∗) = f∗
(
x(new)
)
= x(new)Tβ∗
on a single test observation x(new) ∈ X . Our interest is in the range of summary statistics t∗ that
could be achieved if the researcher were permitted to adjust the dataset Z and hyperparameters ψ.
The approach to this problem is to explicitly constrain data adjustments φ : Z → Z to a set
Φ and hyperparameters to a set Ψ. We assume that φ can be separated into two functions φX and
φY such that for any Z = [X,Y] we have φ(Z) = [φX(X), φY(Y)]. We then wish to calculate
the minimum and maximum summary statistics over these two sets, Ψ and Φ, which constrain
researcher choices:
amin := min
ψ∈Ψ,φ∈Φ
t
(
φ(Z), φX(X
(new)), argmin
f∈Fψ
L (φ(Z), f, ψ)
)
, (1)
amax := max
ψ∈Ψ,φ∈Φ
t
(
φ(Z), φX(X
(new)), argmin
f∈Fψ
L (φ(Z), f, ψ)
)
. (2)
Notice hyperparameters ψ impact amin and amax through Fψ (e.g., by controlling the max depth of
decision trees) as well as through the loss directly (e.g., by controlling the regularization). In other
words, ψ is assumed to contain all relevant hyperparameters, both to determine hard constraints
on the function class, as well as soft constraints through regularization. We define the interval
[amin, amax] as the prescriptively-constrained hacking interval. For example, if the summary statis-
tic t is a prediction of f on a new point x(new), then Equations (1) and (2) can be written as:
amin = min
ψ∈Ψ,φ∈Φ
f
(
φX
(
x(new)
))
s.t. f ∈ argmin
Fψ
L(φ(Z), f, ψ)
amax = max
ψ∈Ψ,φ∈Φ
f
(
φX
(
x(new)
))
s.t. f ∈ argmin
Fψ
L(φ(Z), f, ψ).
While a prescriptively-constrained hacking interval is designed for a single loss function, one
could include in ψ a hyperparameter that switches between more than one loss function, allowing
for specification of the loss function to be among the researcher choices.
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3.1 Examples
We present examples of prescriptively-constrained hacking intervals for k-nearest neighbor (where
the researcher chooses k within a reasonable range), matching for causal inference (where the re-
searcher chooses a matching algorithm), and adding a new feature (where the researcher adds a new
feature constrained by its relationship to existing data).
3.1.1 k-NN
This is a simple example. Suppose we have observed data Z = {xi, yi}ni=1 and we wish to predict on
a new point x(new) by averaging nearby observations. In this example we will keep the data Z fixed
but allow the researcher to choose the hyperparameter k, the number of nearest neighbors over which
to average. To construct a simple prescriptively-constrained hacking interval, we define a subset of
reasonable hyperparameter choices Ψ, which in this case we can write as a range [kmin, kmax], and
find the range of predictions on a new point x(new) subject to the constraint that k ∈ [kmin, kmax]:
max/min
k∈[kmin,kmax]
1
k
∑
j
η
(k)
i(new)j
yj
where η(k)ij is an indicator that is one if xj is within the k nearest neighbors of xi and zero otherwise.
This range of predictions is the prescriptively-constrained hacking interval. Notice that there is no
loss function. The hyperparameter k allows for only one function in the function space Fk (namely,
the one that averages over the k nearest neighbors). To solve this problem, we evaluate the nearest
neighbor average for each k within the range Ψ = [kmin, kmax].
Prescriptively-constrained hacking intervals require that the researcher justify to readers their
choice of Ψ, and we recommend that this discussion be briefly included in every paper. This ap-
proach therefore does not remove all research discretion, and arguably not all hacking, but it changes
the nature of scholarly papers from a justification of a single specification to one where they justify
a definition for the range of reasonable specifications.
One possibility for this choice is to center Ψ = [kmin, kmax] around a fixed value and calculate
the hacking interval over [kmin, kmax] constraints of increasing width. For example, find k∗ ∈ [1, n−
1] that minimizes the training error and then find the hacking interval over Ψ(m) := [k∗−m, k∗+m]
for each m = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,mmax, where mmax handles the edge cases so that Ψ ⊂ [0, n]. Figure (1)
shows the results of such a procedure for a dataset in two dimensions and x(new) = (0.5, 0.5). We
find that k∗ = 5 minimizes the training error and the resulting prediction on x(new) is 0.6. However,
if the researcher is allowed to pick any k in [k∗−2, k∗+2] = [3, 5], for example, then the prediction
ranges from .57 to .70. This is the hacking interval for m = 2. Displaying the hacking interval as a
function ofm illustrates the sensitivity of the hacking interval to the freedom given to the researcher.
Another choice for the range of k could be to use prior information of acceptable past researcher
choices. We might choose the range of k large enough to include the smallest and largest k’s used
in k-nearest neighbor in any article in the last 5 years in that field. In practice, that interval may
actually be the smallest and largest values that would not be objected to by reviewers.
Other researcher choices for k-NN that we did not consider in this example could include the
distance function or the weighting of the k nearest neighbors. The use of k-NN as the predictive
function class could also be considered a researcher degree of freedom. We could use a binary
hyperparameter to switch between k-NN and any other regression algorithm.
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Figure 1: Left: Observed data with distance to k = 3, 5, and 7 nearest neighbors highlighted, where
k∗ = 5. Right: Hacking intervals as a function of the hyperparameters space width m. m = 2
corresponds to a hacking interval over researcher choice [k∗ − 2, k∗ + 2] = [3, 7].
3.1.2 MATCHING
Matching methods in causal inference are a key example of where a hacking interval can be use-
ful in strengthening or weakening conclusions made from data. An analyst’s choice of matching
algorithm may have a huge impact on the conclusion, and this impact could be much larger than
the uncertainty due to randomness in the data. It is entirely possible that two well-meaning an-
alysts, given the same data, would choose two different matching algorithms for treatment and
control units and reach two entirely different conclusions. It does not make sense to model the set
of choices that analysts would make when choosing between possible matching algorithms. The
analyst’s choice could be arbitrary; it depends on the algorithms available at the time, the popularity
of these algorithms among scientists, the order of the data in the database, and other choices that
are totally separate from the ground truth treatment effect. The analyst does not choose matches
from a uniform distribution among reasonable matching possibilities (simple examples where one
good match assignment is clearly better than another can show why this would be an unreasonable
assumption). In the work of Noor-E-Alam and Rudin (2015a,b), the authors take a hacking interval
approach by specifying that an unreasonable match assignment would have at least one matched
treatment/control pair whose covariates are far away from each other. The converse of this set con-
sists of reasonable match assignments, even though some of these match assignments would not
be chosen by any matching algorithm that we could envision. Noor-E-Alam and Rudin (2015a,b)
compute a prescriptively-constrained hacking interval, in that they compute the range of treatment
effect estimates corresponding to all reasonable match assignments. For some datasets, they find
that all reasonable match assignments yield the same conclusion. In other cases, the range of treat-
ment effects corresponding to reasonable matches is very large. Their technique uses mixed-integer
programming, so that they can determine the maximum and minimum test statistics over all match
assignments without having to enumerate them.
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If we find that any reasonable match assignment yields the same conclusion, then it is a much
stronger result than saying that one reasonable match assignment (as is typically considered) yields
a particular conclusion. Consider the experiment done by Noor-E-Alam and Rudin (2015a,b) on
the GLOW (Global Longitudinal study of Osteoporosis in Women) data (Jr. et al., 2013). The goal
was to determine whether smoking causes bone fractures using McNemar’s test. Their experiments
showed that no matter which reasonable analyst creates the matched pairs, the conclusion is the
same: smoking causes bone fractures. Figure 2, reproduced from Noor-E-Alam and Rudin (2015a),
shows the hacking intervals of the P -value of McNemar’s test for different numbers of matched
groups. The figure shows that if any reasonable analyst constructs match assignments with 30
or more “unmatched” pairs (where treatment and control outcomes differ), the worst (highest) P -
value possible they can achieve is 0.003, meaning the result will be significant at the 0.05 level no
matter which matching method the analyst uses. This example demonstrates how hacking intervals
can sometimes strengthen scientific conclusions. (In other cases, hacking intervals can weaken
conclusions).
Figure 2: Prescriptively-constrained hacking intervals of the P -value of McNemar’s test for differ-
ent numbers of matched groups. Figure reproduced from Noor-E-Alam and Rudin (2015a).
3.1.3 ADDING A NEW FEATURE
The addition of a new feature to a given collection of features, possibly from existing features
(such as an interaction term) or from new data, is a data adjustment that can impact the conclusions
about prediction models. A prescriptively-constrained hacking interval in this context is the range
of a summary statistic that can be achieved over all of the possible choices made by the researcher
about new features, subject to explicit constraints on those choices. If the researcher is given the
freedom to choose each of n feature values (one for each observation), then solving this problem
10
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requires optimizing over a potentially large space, since there are n choices made by the researcher.
Fortunately, it may only be necessary to specify a small number of attributes about the new feature to
calculate its impact on the summary statistic. The prescriptively-constrained hacking interval would
then be an optimization problem over a smaller space of attributes, subject to explicit constraints on
those attributes.
In a causal inference setting, where the researcher observes a treatment feature among other
possibly confounding features, sensitivity analysis deals with this exact problem. The goal is to
find the impact on a causal effect (the summary statistic) of an unmeasured confounder u (the
new feature).2 To do this one needs to choose a value for several attributes about the unmeasured
confounder. There are a number of approaches to this problem that require different attributes of
u to be chosen (see Liu et al., 2013, for a review), but generally only a few attributes are required:
its distribution, its relationship to the outcome, and its relationship to the treatment. In applications
of causal sensitivity analysis, a researcher will often display the adjusted causal effect for each of
a few choices of these attributes. If we explicitly define a range of choices for each attribute, then
the maximum and minimum causal effect over these ranges is a prescriptively-constrained hacking
interval.
The motivation of causal sensitivity analysis and prescriptively-constrained hacking are dif-
ferent. In causal sensitivity analysis, u exists but is unmeasured by the researcher. Constraints
on the values of the attributes of u are based on what we believe is scientifically reasonable. In
prescriptively-constrained hacking, u is created by the researcher. Constraints on the values of the
attributes of u are based on what we believe is a reasonable amount of researcher freedom.
We now define our approach in more detail. Let Y = (y1, . . . , yn)T ∈ {−1, 1}n be a n × 1
matrix of observed binary outcomes, X = (xTi , . . . ,x
T
n )
T an n × p matrix of observed covariates,
and W = (w1, . . . , wn)T ∈ {0, 1}n an n × 1 matrix of observed binary covariates. In a causal
inference setting, W is the treatment. The researcher degrees of freedom constitute the choice of
an additional binary covariate U = (u1, . . . , un)T ∈ {0, 1}n. This is equivalent to the choice of a
data adjustment function φ : [Y,X,W] 7→ [Y,X,W,U]. Once φ has been chosen we assume the
researcher finds a model f from a set of linear functions F of the form:
f([x, w, u]) = β0 + x
Tβx + βww + βuu
by minimizing the logistic loss function:
L([X,W,U], f) =
n∑
i=1
log(1 + e−yif([xi,wi,ui])),
Notice this is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood under the model:
logit Pr(Y = 1 | x, w, u) = f([x, w, u]),
where Y is the random variable corresponding to the observed y. In other words, the researcher
performs logistic regression. (For simplicity, the objective is fixed and there are no user choices
except to add the extra feature.) We further assume the researcher is interested in the odds ratio of
y and w controlling for covariates x and u:
ORyw|xu :=
Pr(Y = 1 | x, w = 1, u)
Pr(Y = 1 | x, w = 0, u) ,
2. Alternatively, the goal may be to assume the unmeasured confounder reduced the causal effect to zero and see what
this would imply about the unmeasured confounder.
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so we set the test statistic to be t(f) := eβw . The steps followed by the researcher can be summa-
rized as follows:
• 1a: Choose a data adjustment φ ∈ Φ (we discuss Φ below).
• 1b: Find fˆ([x, w, u]) = βˆ0 + xT βˆx + βˆww + βˆuu that minimizes the logistic loss on the
adjusted data, (Y,X,W,U) = φ(Y,X,W).
• 1c: Calculate the summary statistic ÔRyw|xu = t(fˆ) = eβˆw .
The prescriptively-constrained hacking interval is the maximum and minimum values of t(fˆ) that
can be achieved over all of the possible researcher choices of φ ∈ Φ. There are no hyperparameters
in this example.
Interestingly, we can calculate ÔRyw|xu without knowing the researcher-created covariate u
exactly. We need only know the relationship of u to the binary covariate w, specified by p0 :=
p(U | w = 0) and p1 := Pr(U | w = 1) (where U is the random variable corresponding to u), and
the relationship of u to the binary outcome y, specified by ORyu := Pr(Y = 1 | u = 1)/Pr(Y =
1 | u = 0). When p0, p1, and ORyu are known, Lin et al. (1998) show3 that we can derive the odds
ratio adjusting for x and u, ÔRyw|xu = t(fˆ), from the odds ratio that only adjusts for x, ÔRyw|x,
by the following formula:
ÔRyw|xu =
1
AF
ÔRyw|x (3)
where
AF =
(ORyu − 1)p1 + 1
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1 . (4)
We write ORyu rather than ÔRyu because the former quantity is the true odds ratio, not one esti-
mated from the data.
Since ÔRyw|x can be estimated from the observed data, Equations (3) and (4) imply the impact
of the researcher choice of u is completely summarized by p1, p0, and ORyu, since they determine
AF . Conversely, if we knew the data adjustment φ we could estimate p1, p0, and ORyu, calling
the estimates pˆ1, pˆ0, and ÔRyu, respectively, from the adjusted data. Steps 1a-1c are therefore
equivalent to Steps 2a-2d defined by:
• 2a: Calculate ÔRyw|x.
• 2b: Choose a data adjustment φ ∈ Φ.
• 2c: Calculate ÔRyu, pˆ1, and pˆ0 using the adjusted data [Y,X,W,U] = φ([Y,X,W]).
• 2d: Calculate the summary statistic ÔRyw|xu = 1ÂF ÔRyw|x, where ÂF analogous to Equa-
tion (4) but depends on the estimated quantities ÔRyu, pˆ1, and pˆ0:
ÂF =
(ORyu − 1)pˆ1 + 1
(ÔRyu − 1)pˆ0 + 1
. (5)
3. Lin et al. (1998) show this result exactly for log-linear regression, but they argue it should hold approximately for
logistic regression.
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Notice that the researcher’s choice of a data adjustment φ implies a value for u and the three at-
tributes about u — ÔRyu, pˆ1, and pˆ0 — but it is through these three attributes only that φ impacts
the summary statistic. If we instead allow the researcher to choose only the three attributes, we can
find the impact on the summary statistic without ever knowing u. We just need to define the space
of allowable data adjustments Φ in terms of its impact on these three attributes:
Φ :=
{
φ : (Y,X,W) 7→ (Y,X,W,U) | ÔRyu ∈ [a, b], |pˆ1 − pˆ0| ≤ c, pˆ0 > d
}
,
for constants a, b, and c < d (the reason for these exact constraints will be come clear later). Then,
Steps 2a-2d can be replaced with Steps 3a-3c defined by:
• 3a: Calculate ÔRyw|x.
• 3b: Choose ORyu, p0, and p1 such that ORyu ∈ [a, b], |p1 − p0| ≤ c, and p0 ≥ d.
• 3c: Calculate the summary statistic ÔRyw|x,u = 1AF ÔRyw|X , where AF depends on ORyu,
p0, and p1.
For equivalent choice of constraints, the maximum and minimum values of ÔRyw|x,u that could
be achieved by any of the three sequences of Steps (1a-1c, 2a-2d, and 3a-3c) are all equal. We can
think of finding the maximum and minimum values of ÔRyw|x,u for each of the three sequences as
the three following optimization problems (each solved for the maximum and minimum):
Steps 1a-1c: max/min
φ∈Φ
{
ORyw|xu
}
(6)
Steps 2a-2d: max/min
φ s.t.

ÔRyu ∈ [a, b]
|pˆ1 − pˆ0| ≤ c
pˆ0 > d
{
1
ÂF
ÔRyw|x
}
(7)
Steps 3a-3c: max/min
ORyu ∈ [a, b]
|p1 − p0| ≤ c
p0 ≥ d
{
1
AF
ÔRyw|x
}
. (8)
Optimization Problem (8) will prove the most useful as it does not require knowledge of u. Since
ÔRyw|x is estimated from the observed data, solving Optimization Problem (8) is equivalent to
solving for the maximum and minimum values of AF subject to the same constraints and dividing
ÔRyw|x by each value. Using Equation (4) for AF , we find the maximum and minimum values of
AF by solving the following optimization problem:
max/min
ORyw,p1,p0
(ORty − 1)p1 + 1
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1 s.t.

ORyu ∈ [a, b]
|p1 − p0| ≤ c
p0 ≥ d
. (9)
Dividing ÔRyw|x by the maximum and minimum values given by Optimization Problem (9) gives
the minimum and maximum values, respectively, of ORyw|xu, which define the hacking interval in
this case.
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We can solve Equation (9) for the case where ORyu is fixed greater than one (implying Pr(Y =
1 | u = 1) > Pr(Y = 1 | u = 0)). In this case, the maximization problem in Equation (9) (i.e., the
hacking interval upper bound) becomes:
max
|p1 − p0| ≤ c
p0 ≥ d
(ORyu − 1)p1 + 1
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1 = maxp0≥d
(ORyu − 1)(p0 + c) + 1
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1
= max
p0≥d
1 +
(ORyu − 1)c
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1 ,
while the minimization problem (i.e., the hacking interval lower bound) becomes:
min
|p1 − p0| ≤ c
p0 ≥ d
(ORyu − 1)p1 + 1
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1 = minp0≥d
(ORyu − 1)(p0 − c) + 1
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1
= min
p0≥d
1− (ORyu − 1)c
(ORyu − 1)p0 + 1 .
In each case, the optimum occurs at p0 = d. Therefore, Equation (9) can be solved when ORyu is
fixed greater than one. We apply this result in Section 6.1.
This section shows how results from causal sensitivity analysis can be leveraged to solve prob-
lems where the researcher is permitted to hack a new feature. Here, we have been in a non-causal
inference setting of logistic regression modeling. In Section 6.1 we apply these results to a recidi-
vism dataset.
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4. Tethered Hacking Intervals
In prescriptively-constrained hacking intervals, discussed in Section 3, we optimize over a data ad-
justment function φ and hyperparameters ψ constrained to be in sets Φ and Ψ, respectively. An
advantage of this approach is that we can clearly define acceptable researcher adjustments. A disad-
vantage is that the possible adjustments may be difficult to enumerate or optimize over efficiently.
One way to circumvent this requirement is to allow any choice of ψ and φ so long as the loss using
the unadjusted data Z and a set of default hyperparameters ψd is not too large. The tethered hacking
interval is the minimum and maximum summary statistic under this constraint. In other words, it is
given by the interval [bmin, bmax],
bmin := min
f∈Fψd
t
(
Z,X(new), f
)
s.t. L (Z, f, ψd) ≤ θ, (10)
bmax := max
f∈Fψd
t
(
Z,X(new), f
)
s.t. L (Z, f, ψd) ≤ θ. (11)
given a fixed, chosen value of θ.
For example, suppose F is the set of constant functions f(x) = λ, t(Z,X(new), f) = λ is the
parameter λ that defines f , and L is the quadratic loss for each of n observations in dataset Z. There
are no hyperparameters ψd so we suppress their notation. Then Equations (10) and (11) become:
bmin = min
λ
λ s.t.
n∑
i=1
(λ− yi)2 ≤ θ
bmax = max
λ
λ s.t.
n∑
i=1
(λ− yi)2 ≤ θ.
For another example, if F is the set of linear functions f(x) = λ0 + λ1x, t(Z, f) = λ0 + λ1x(new)
is a prediction of f on a new point x(new), and L is the same quadratic loss, then Equations (10) and
(11) become:
bmin = min
λ0,λ1
λ0 + λ1x
(new) s.t.
n∑
i=1
(λ0 + λ1xi − yi)2 ≤ θ
bmax = max
λ0,λ1
λ0 + λ1x
(new) s.t.
n∑
i=1
(λ0 + λ1xi − yi)2 ≤ θ.
In general, when the summary statistic is a prediction on a new point x(new), Equations (10) and
(11) become:
bmin = min
f∈Fψd
f
(
x(new)
)
s.t. L(Z, f, ψd) ≤ θ
bmax = max
f∈Fψd
f
(
x(new)
)
s.t. L(Z, f, ψd) ≤ θ.
The interpretation of a tethered hacking interval is that a researcher could have hacked the data
or adjusted the hyperparameters to obtain values of the test statistic in the interval. In other words,
for each point b′ ∈ {bmin}∪{bmax}∪B, whereB ⊂ [bmin, bmax], there could exist a data adjustment
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function φ′ and a set of hyperparameters ψ′ such that b′ is the output of the summary statistic when
applied to the minimum loss predictive model f using φ′ and ψ′. That is,
b′ = t
(
φ′(Z), φ′X(X
(new)), argmin
f∈Fψ′
L
(
φ′(Z), f, ψ′
))
.
This interpretation describes how results are hacked in practice. First, a researcher chooses how
to adjust a dataset and which hyperparameters are appropriate, and then summarizes the resulting
best function in a class. The purpose of a tethered hacking interval is to bound the results of this
procedure by specifying a single constraint on the loss function.
The set of models achieving small loss is also called the Rashomon Set, based on terminology
originally due to Leo Breiman, and an analogy to the Japanese movie Rashomon. The work of Fisher
et al. (2018) introduces a measure of variable importance for a class of prediction functions based
on the Rashomon set. While their “empirical model class reliance” measure of variable importance
could be viewed as a type of hacking interval, their goal is to study the population version of this
quantity, in order to judge variable importance for the population.
Notice two things about tethered hacking intervals. First, when the loss function corresponds
to a likelihood function, tethered hacking intervals are equivalent to profile likelihood confidence
intervals for an appropriate choice of the loss threshold θ. We explore this in Section 4.2. Second,
as with prescriptively-constrained hacking intervals, a tethered hacking interval is a statement about
the degree to which summaries of a single observed dataset could be hacked by a researcher. It does
not require an assumption about a true data generating procedure. In Section 4.3 we make such
an assumption about the true data generating procedure and derive an appropriate generalization
bound in order to unite traditional inference with our new inference paradigm. Before that, we
discuss examples of tethered hacking intervals for SVM, kernel regression, and feature selection
using PCA.
4.1 Examples
4.1.1 SVM
In this section we demonstrate how hacking intervals can be calculated in the context of support
vector machines (SVM). Recall that SVM is trained by minimizing the following loss function:
L(Z, f, ψd) =
1
2
‖λ‖22 + ψd
n∑
i=1
(1− yif(xi))+,
where f(x) := λTx+λ0 is the scaled distance of x to the separating hyperplane and ψd ∈ R+ is a
hyperparameter than controls the degree of regularization. Here, we define the summary statistic as
the distance of a new point x(new) to the separating hyperplane. The hacking interval is then given
by:
max/min
λ,λ0
λTx(new) + λ0 s.t.
1
2
‖λ‖22 + ψd
n∑
i=1
(1− yi(λTxi + λ0))+ ≤ θ, (12)
where θ controls the loss tolerance. Figure 13 illustrates this problem.
For simplicity we can write both the min and max problems from Equation (12) as a single
minimization problem that depends on the choice of a binary variable s ∈ {−1,+1} (s = 1 for
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min, s = −1 for max). If we also write the loss constraint in terms of slack variables ξ then
Equation (12) becomes:
min
λ,λ0,ξ
sλTx(new) + sλ0 s.t.

yi(λ
Txi + λ0) ≥ 1− ξi, ∀i
ξi ≥ 0, ∀i
1
2 ‖λ‖22 + ψd
∑n
i=1 ξi ≤ θ.
(13)
This is a convex optimization problem. The objective is linear. The first two constraints are the same
as in non-separable SVM and are linear. The last constraint is the sum of a norm (always convex)
and a linear function in ξ, so it is convex; also, it is the objective function for non-separable SVM.
Therefore, we can apply the KKT conditions to obtain the dual problem. The following theorem
shows the result.
Proposition 1 (Hacking Intervals for SVM) The solution to optimization problem (13) is given by
λ∗ =
1
β∗
(
−sx(new) +
n∑
i=1
α∗i yixi
)
and
λ∗0 = yisv − λ∗Txisv ,
where isv is such that 0 < α∗isv < β
∗ψd and the optimal dual variables (α∗, β∗) are the solutions
to the following dual problem:
max
α,β
− 1
2β
[
x(new)Tx(new) − 2s
∑
αiyix
T
i x
(new) +
∑
i
∑
k
αiαkyiykx
T
i xk
]
+
∑
αi − βθ
s.t.

0 ≤ αi ≤ βψd, ∀i∑n
i=1 αiyi = s
β ≥ 0
.
(14)
In Section 6.2 we apply SVM hacking intervals to a recidivism dataset.
4.1.2 KERNEL REGRESSION
Consider the form of kernel regression where prediction models f ∈ F evaluated at a point xi ∈ Rp
are weighted averages of the labels of the other points, {yj}j 6=i, and where the weight is determined
by a kernel function kψd(dA(xi,xj)) that depends inversely on hyperparameters ψd and the distance
dA(xi,xj) between points xi and xj for parameters A. That is, f is of the form:
fA(xi) =
∑
j 6=i yikψd (dA(xo,xi))∑
j 6=i kψd (dA(xi,xi))
.
We suppose a quadratic loss functionL (Z, fA, ψd) =
∑
i(fA(xi)−yi)2, a Gaussian kernel kψd(d(xi,xj)) =
1/
√
2piψ2d exp
(−d(xi,xj)/ψ2d), and a Mahalanobis distance dA(xi,xj) = (xi − xj)TATA(xi −
xj), where A is a p×p matrix of parameters. Methods for learning A are considered by Weinberger
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Figure 3: Hacking interval for an SVM prediction. The summary statistic being hacked is the
distance from the separating hyperplane to a new observation, x(new). For a default regularization
tradeoff of ψd = 1 and a 5% tolerance on the loss relative to the minimum loss solution, SVM will
always predict a +1 label, but the scaled distance to the hyperplane, λTx(new) +λ0, can range from
about 0.4 to about 1.6.
and Tesauro (2017). A tethered hacking interval [bmin, bmax] for prediction on a new point x(new) is
given by:
bmin = min
A
∑
j yjk
(
dA(x
(new),xj)
)∑
j k
(
dA(x(new),xj)
) s.t. ∑
i
(
yi −
∑
j 6=i yjk (dA(xi,xj))∑
j 6=i k (dA(xi,xj))
)2
≤ θ
bmax = max
A
∑
j yjk
(
dA(x
(new),xj)
)∑
j k
(
dA(x(new),xj)
) s.t. ∑
i
(
yi −
∑
j 6=i yjk (dA(xi,xj))∑
j 6=i k (dA(xi,xj))
)2
≤ θ.
Figure 4 shows an example. Covariates are uniformly distributed on [0, 10]× [0, 10] and any points
on a line of slope one have the same mean outcome. Therefore, the prediction function fA(x)
should assign higher weight to the points to the upper right and to the lower left of x since these
points should have outcomes similar to the outcome of x. Figure 4 shows this result in the level sets
of the Mahalanobis distance metric that defines fA. The middle panel corresponds to the minimum
loss prediction function, while the left and right panels correspond to the prediction functions that
minimize and maximize prediction on x(new) = (5, 5)T , respectively, within a loss constraint θ =
2000 and for ψd = 1. These minimum and maximum predictions, which define a tethered hacking
interval, are −0.94 and 1.17. The minimum loss prediction is −0.32.
4.1.3 PCA FEATURE SELECTION
Hacking intervals can also be used in the context of feature selection. We consider the example
where principal components analysis is employed. There are a number of proposed methods (Mc-
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Figure 4: Level sets of the Mahalanobis distance that defines the kernel regression function fA. The
middle panel corresponds to the minimum loss prediction function, while the left and right panels
correspond to the prediction functions that minimize and maximize prediction on x(new) = (5, 5)T ,
respectively, within a loss constraint θ = 2000 and for ψd = 1.
cabe, 1984; Jolliffe, 1972; Xu et al., 2008), but we focus on one proposed by Guo et al. (2002),
which is similar to Krzanowski (1987).
In this method, we start with a matrix X of n observations and p features and we wish to find
the matrix Xq of n observations and q < p of these features that gives to closest approximation
to X when we compare the principal component scores of X and Xq. That is, we do a principal
component decomposition of each matrix, writing S = XW and Sq = XqWq, where S and Sq
are the matrices of principal component scores of X and Xq, respectively, and W and Wq the
matrices of eigenvectors of XTX and XTq Xq, respectively. We assume the columns of W and Wq
are ordered from largest to smallest eigenvalue, so that the columns of S and Sq are ordered from
largest to smallest variance. We then pick an integer k ≤ q and compare the first k columns (i.e.,
principal component scores) of S and Sq by “superimposing” one matrix on the other. That is, we
find their Procrustes distance, which compares the matrices after optimal translation, scaling, and
rotation. If we define the function space F as the set of all selector functions that map the complete
set {1, . . . , p} of p feature indices to the selected set of q < p feature indices, then the f (i.e.,
the choice of q features) that maximizes this Procrustes distance for a given k will minimize the
following loss function:
L(X, f, k) = trace(S(k)TS(k) + S(k)Tq S
(k)
q − 2Σ) (15)
where S(k) and S(k)q are the first k columns of S and Sq, respectively, and Σ is the diagonal matrix
of singular values of S(k)TS(k)q . Equation (15) represents the loss of structural information in a
candidate subset. In practice we scale the score matrices so that the loss is between 0 and 100. The
number of component scores k is a hyperparameter. Note that while the researcher must choose the
number of selected variables q, this number actually defines the problem, so we do not consider it a
hyperparameter.
Among all of the q feature subsets that result in a loss of less than a small threshold θ, there are
three questions we wish to ask. (i) Is a particular subset j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , (pq)} one of these subsets?
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That is, does subset j of q features yield a small loss of information? (ii) Is feature i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}
included or not included in any of these subsets? That is, to achieve a small loss of information
using q < p features, can we determine if a particular feature i must or must not be used? (iii) What
is the maximum Hamming distance of these subsets to the optimal subset (assuming we represent
the subsets as binary indicators for each feature)? That is, how different could a subset of q features
that yields a small loss of information be from the subset of q features that yields the least loss of
information? Each of these questions corresponds to a different summary statistic. In (i) it is a
binary indicator equal to 1 for subset j and 0 otherwise. In (ii) it is a binary indicator equal to 1
if variable i is included in a subset of q features and 0 if not. In (iii) it is the Hamming distance
between two subsets. Notice that in the first two cases, the hacking interval is either [0, 0], [1, 1],
or [0, 1], while in the last case the hacking interval is between 0 and, at most, 2q, since at most q
variables can differ.
Several PCA variable selection papers (Jolliffe, 1972; Guo et al., 2002; Krzanowski, 1987) have
used a dataset on alate alleges (winged aphids), so we will do the same for comparison. This dataset
consists of 40 observations of 19 variables. See Jeffers (1967) for a full description. Keeping with
common practice on this dataset (Guo et al., 2002), we will restrict our analysis to selecting q = 4
and set a default k = 4 for the number of principal component scores. Reading the three panels
from left to right in Figure 5 we see answers to our three questions for this dataset. Note that in each
case, θ′ is a number added to the minimum loss (which is out of 100).
Of the fourteen feature selection methods analyzed on this dataset by Guo et al. (2002), the
selected features have losses given by Equation (15) that differ by as much as 7.65 (although, note
that only three of the methods seek to minimize this particular loss) and are concentrated around
a group of fifteen of the nineteen features (i.e., four of the features are not selected by any of the
fourteen methods). Our analysis shows that this greatly underestimates the diversity of features that
could be selected, where “selected” means a feature subset yields a loss within a given tolerance
of the minimum loss. Examining Figure 5, we find that within a loss tolerance of 7.65, more than
92% of the 3876 possible 4-feature subsets could be selected (left panel); within a loss tolerance of
only 1.66, each of the 19 features is contained in at least one 4-feature subset that could be selected
(middle panel); and within loss tolerance of only 0.59, a four-feature subset could be selected that
is disjoint from the optimal 4-feature subset (right panel). This illustrates the advantage of our
systematic approach over the approach of aggregating past studies.
4.2 Connection to Profile Likelihood
Tethered hacking intervals are closely related to profile likelihood confidence intervals. When the
loss function L corresponds to a likelihood function L and the test statistic t is a single parameter
of the learned prediction function f , then a tethered hacking interval is mathematically equivalent
to a profile likelihood confidence interval for an appropriate choice of the loss threshold θ. In this
section we quantify this equivalence.
Suppose a likelihood function L(λ, ξ) depends on a low-dimensional parameter of interest λ
and a higher-dimensional nuisance parameter ξ. The profile likelihood Lp focuses attention on λ by
“profiling out” ξ:
Lp(λ) := sup
ξ
L(λ, ξ)
= L(λ, ξˆλ),
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Figure 5: Left: Number of q-feature subsets that yield a loss within the tolerance Middle: Number
of unique features that are included in at least one subset that yields a loss within the tolerance.
Right: Maximum Hamming distance between the optimal q-feature solution any q-feature solution
that yields a loss within the tolerance. θ′ is a number added to the minimum loss (which is out of
100).
where ξˆλ maximizes the likelihood when λ is fixed. The profile likelihoodLp is a lower dimensional
function that for many purposes can be used instead of the full, higher-dimensional likelihood L.
Notably, [λˆ, ξˆ] maximizes the full likelihood if any only if λˆ maximizes the profile likelihood. In-
teresting for our purposes is the property that the ratio of profile likelihoods Lp(λ0)/Lp(λˆ) equals
the ratio of likelihoods Λλ0 for testing the null hypothesis H0 : λ = λ0:
Lp(λ0)
Lp(λˆ)
=
supξ L(λ0, ξ)
supξ L(λˆ, ξ)
=
supξ L(λ0, ξ)
supλ,ξ L(λ, ξ)
:= Λλ0 .
By Wilks’ Theorem, if H0 is true and a few regularity conditions are met, then as the sample size
n→∞,
−2 log Λλ0 d−→ χ2m,
where m is the difference in the dimensions of λ and ξ (Wilks, 1938). A hypothesis test for H0
would reject H0 if −2 log Λλ0 is large, which happens when the maximum likelihood under H0,
supξ L(λ0, ξ), is small. If λ is a scalar, the set of λ0 for which H0 : λ = λ0 is not rejected provides
a confidence interval for λ. That is, a 1− α profile likelihood likelihood confidence interval for λ is
given by [pmin, pmax], where:
pmin := minλ s.t. − 2 log(Λλ) ≤ χ2m,1−α,
pmax := maxλ s.t. − 2 log(Λλ) ≤ χ2m,1−α,
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and χ2m,1−α is the 1 − α quantile of a χ2 distribution with m degrees of freedom. Equivalently, in
terms of the profile likelihood we have:
pmin = minλ s.t. logLp(λ) ≥ logLp(λˆ)− 1
2
χ2m,1−α, (16)
pmin = maxλ s.t. logLp(λ) ≥ logLp(λˆ)− 1
2
χ2m,1−α. (17)
If we define θp(α) := logLp(λˆ)− 12χ2m,1−α then we have:
pmin = minλ s.t. logLp(λ) ≥ θp(α), (18)
pmin = maxλ s.t. logLp(λ) ≥ θp(α). (19)
Equations (18) and (19) are similar to Equations (10) and (11) that define tethered hacking intervals
if the summary statistic t is a single parameter λ of the prediction function fλ,ξ; that is, if t(fλ,ξ) =
λ. In this case, both the profile likelihood confidence interval and the tethered hacking interval are
the minimum and maximum of the summary statistic that can be achieved subject to a constraint on
how well the prediction function fits the observed data. In the case of a profile likelihood confidence
interval, the fit constraint is a lower bound θp(α) := logLp(λˆ)− 12χ2m,1−α on the profile likelihood.
In the case of a tethered hacking interval, the fit constraint is an upper bound θ on the loss. To
summarize, if t(fλ,ξ) = λ, then:
Profile likelihood interval: max/min
λ
λ s.t. logLp(λ) ≥ θp(α),
Tethered hacking interval: max/min
λ,ξ
λ s.t. L(Z, fλ,ξ, ψd) ≤ θ.
Notice that the profile likelihood confidence interval is an optimization over λ only, while the teth-
ered hacking interval is an optimization over λ and ξ. However, since the objective function of the
tethered hacking interval does not depend on ξ, and the loss is constrained by an upper bound, we
can do no better in the optimization than by plugging in the ξ that minimizes the loss for a fixed λ,
ξˆλ := argminξL(Z, fλ,ξ, ψd), into the tethered hacking interval constraint. In other words, we can
“profile out” the nuisance parameter ξ from the loss function as we did with the likelihood function.
Therefore, we have:
Profile likelihood interval: max/min
λ
λ s.t. logLp(λ) ≥ θp(α) (20)
Tethered hacking interval: max/min
λ
λ s.t. L(Z, fλ,ξˆλ , ψd) ≤ θ. (21)
This shows the equivalence of a profile likelihood confidence interval and a tethered hacking interval
when the summary statistic is a single parameter λ of the prediction function. Notice the profile
likelihood confidence interval requires the existence of a likelihood model, whereas the tethered
hacking interval requires the existence of only a loss function.
If we are given a likelihood function L(λ, ξ) and threshold θp(α) that define a profile likelihood
confidence interval for the parameter λ at confidence level α, we can construct a loss function
L(Z, fλ,ξ, ψd) and loss threshold θ that define an equivalent tethered hacking interval. We do this
by defining the loss function as the negative log likelihood and the loss threshold as the negative
likelihood threshold:
L(Z, fλ,ξ, ψd) := − logL(λ, ξ), (22)
θ := −θp(α). (23)
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We assume the function class F is clear from the definition of the likelihood. Taking the infimum
over ξ of Equation (22) we have:
inf
ξ
L(Z, fλ,ξ, ψd) = inf
ξ
− logL(λ, ξ)
⇐⇒ L(Z, fλ,ξˆλ , ψd) = − sup
ξ
logL(λ, ξ)
= − log sup
ξ
L(λ, ξ)
= − logLp(λ).
This means:
{λ | logLp(λ) ≥ θp(α)} = {λ | − logLp(λ) ≤ −θp(α)}
=
{
λ | L(Z, fλ,ξˆλ , ψd) ≤ θ
}
.
The profile likelihood confidence interval and tethered hacking interval given in Equations (20) and
(21), respectively, will therefore be the same, since each is defined by the minimum and maximum
value of the same objective function over the same set.
We illustrate the construction of a tethered hacking interval from a profile likelihood confidence
interval with the example of linear regression. Suppose the outcomes Y = (y1, . . . , yn)T are
generated by the following linear model with independent Gaussian noise of known variance σ2:
Y ∼ N(Xξ + Wλ, σ2I),
where X = (x1, . . . ,xTn )
T and W = (w1, . . . , wn)T are, respectively, n× p and n× 1 matrices of
covariates, ξ is a p× 1 vector of nuisance parameters, and λ is the scalar parameter of interest. The
log likelihood for this model is:
logL(ξ, λ0) = log
n∏
i=1
(2piσ2)−1/2 exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(
xTi ξ + wiλ− yi
)2}
= −n
2
log(2piσ2)− 1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξ + wiλ− yi
)2
. (24)
By Equation (20), the profile likelihood confidence interval at confidence level α is defined by the
minimum and maximum values of λ for which the following inequality holds:
logLp(λ) ≥ θp(α)
logLp(λ) ≥ logLp(λˆ)− 1
2
χ21,1−α
−n
2
log(2piσ2)− 1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆλ + wiλ− yi
)2 ≥ −n
2
log(2piσ2)− 1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆ + wiλˆ− yi
)2 − 1
2
χ21,1−α
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆλ + wiλ− yi
)2 ≤ n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆ + wiλˆ− yi
)2
+ σ2χ21,1−α. (25)
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To construct an equivalent tethered hacking interval, we define the loss by Equation (22):
L(Z, fξ,λ, ψd) := − logL(ξ, λ)
=
n
2
log(2piσ2) +
1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξ + wiλ− yi
)2
and the loss threshold by Equation (23):
θ := −θp(α)
= − logLp(λˆ) + 1
2
χ2m,1−α
=
n
2
log(2piσ2) +
1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆ + wiλˆ− yi
)2
+
1
2
χ21,1−α.
By Equation (21), the tethered hacking interval is defined by the minimum and maximum values of
λ for which the following inequality holds:
L(Z, fλ,ξˆλ , ψd) ≤ θ
n
2
log(2piσ2) +
1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆ + wiλ− yi
)2 ≤ n
2
log(2piσ2) +
1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆ + wiλˆ− yi
)2
+
1
2
χ21,1−α
n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆλ + wiλ− yi
)2 ≤ n∑
i=1
(
xTi ξˆ + wiλˆ− yi
)2
+ σ2χ21,1−α. (26)
Since Equations (25) and (26) are the same, the profile likelihood confidence interval and tethered
hacking intervals are the same, since each is defined by the minimum and maximum value of λ over
the same set of λ. Notice any monotonic function applied to the loss function and loss threshold
will yield the same set of λ for which the loss funciton exceeds the loss threshold.
4.3 Generalization Bound
Tethered hacking intervals do not require the assumption of a true data generating process; how-
ever, if we do assume a true data generating process µ, we can extend the interpretation of tethered
hacking intervals to this setting and, in the case of learning classification functions, derive a gen-
eralization bound that incorporates both the uncertainty due to observing a random draw from the
true data generating process and the uncertainty due to researcher hacking. The interpretation of a
hacking interval in this setting begins with the following sequence of events:
1. The true distribution µ generates independently and identically a “pristine” dataset Zp of n
observations.
2. φ˜ : Z → Z transforms the pristine data, Zp, into what the researcher actually observes, Zo.
3. φ : Z → Z transforms the observed data,Zo, into the hacked data the researcher uses in their
analysis, Zh. This is the same φ as in the tethered hacking interval definition.
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In other words, in order to do inference or prediction on the true data generating process µ, a
researcher would like to perform their analysis on a dataset generated by µ, which we call the
pristine data Zp. However, we assume the researcher only observes Zo, which is the pristine data
after applying an unknown data adjustment function φ˜. In an attempt to undo φ˜, the researcher
chooses a data adjustment function of their own, φ. The result of applying φ to Zo is the hacked
data Zh. Schematically, we can write this procedure as:
Zp︸︷︷︸
Pristine
data
φ˜−→ Zo︸︷︷︸
Observed
data
φ−→ Zh︸︷︷︸
Hacked
data
.
On each of the three datasets —Zp, Zo, andZh — there is at least one function from a function
class F that minimizes the empirical risk on a loss function L(Z, f).4 We call these functions fp,
fo, and fh, respectively. That is, we define the following:
• fp ∈ arg minf∈F RempZp (f) := arg minf∈F L(Zp, f) minimizes the empirical risk of the
pristine dataset, Zp. Since we do not observe Zp we cannot learn it.
• fo ∈ arg minf∈F RempZo (f) := arg minf∈F L(Zo, f) minimizes the empirical risk of the
observed dataset, Zo. This is the function that would be learned if we did not allow for
hacking.
• fh ∈ arg minf∈F RempZh (f) := arg minf∈F L(Zh, f) minimizes the empirical risk of the
hacked dataset, Zh. It is learned by the researcher.
In a classical statistical setting — where the researcher observes Zp and computes fp — a question
from statistical learning theory is how the true risk of fp, Rtrueµ (fp) := EZ∼µL(Z, fp), differs from
the empirical risk of fp on Zp, R
emp
Zp
(fp) := L(Zp, fp). If F consists of classification functions,
a bound on this difference can be found using statistical learning theory. In a hacking setting —
where the researcher observes Zo, adjusts the data to obtain Zh, and computes fh — there is addi-
tional uncertainty due to the data adjustments. In order to derive an analogous bound, this time to
understand how the true risk of fp differs from the empirical risk of fh on Zh, we will need to make
a few assumptions about the impact of the data adjustments:
•
∣∣∣RempZp (fp)−RempZo (fp)∣∣∣ ≤ θ1, which we call “reverse tethering (part 1).” It means that the
function fp that minimizes the loss on the pristine data does not yield a loss too different on
the observed data.
•
∣∣RempZo (fp)−RempZo (fo)∣∣ ≤ θ2, which we call “reverse tethering (part 2).” It means that the
functions learned from the pristine data and the observed data do not have losses too different
from each other on the observed data.
•
∣∣RempZo (fo)−RempZo (fh)∣∣ ≤ θ3, which is our standard tethering constraint used in Equations
(10) and (11). It means that the functions learned from the observed data and the hacked data
do not have losses too different from each other on the observed data.
4. Both the function class F and the loss function L(Z, f) can depend on hyperparameters ψd, but hyperparameters are
not important to this section so we suppress their notation.
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µ Zp Zo Zh
fp R
true
Zµ
(fp)
V C−−→ RempZp (fp)
θ1−→ RempZo (fp) R
emp
Zh
(fp)y θ2
fo R
true
Zµ
(fo) R
emp
Zp
(fo) R
emp
Zo
(fo) R
emp
Zh
(fo)y θ3
fh R
true
Zµ
(fh) R
emp
Zp
(fh) R
emp
Zo
(fh)
θ4−→ RempZh (fh)
Table 1: We can relate the true risk of fh, RtrueZµ (fp), to the empirical risk of fh on Zh, R
emp
Zh
(fh), by
applying a VC bound and the triangle inequality four times.
• Let
∣∣∣RempZo (fh)−RempZh (fh)∣∣∣ = θ4. This is not an assumption since it can be calculated by the
researcher. For the function fh that minimizes the loss on the hacked data, it is the difference
between the loss on the observed data and the hacked data.
We can bound the difference between the true risk of fh and the empirical risk of fh onZh by apply-
ing the triangle inequality several times and bounding each intermediate difference. The assump-
tions about θ1, θ2, and θ3, and the calculated θ4, provide bounds on all but one of these intermediate
differences. The final intermediate difference is between the true risk of fh and the empirical risk of
fh on fp. This can be bounded by the same learning theory bound we would derive in a classical sta-
tistical setting, since it holds uniformly for all functions in F . Table 1 summarizes the relationships
and Proposition 2 gives the result.
Proposition 2 (Generalization Bound for Hacked Data) If F is a set of classification functions
with Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension h, then, for all δ > 0, with probability of at least 1 − δ with
respect to data Zp drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution µ on Rn×p × {−1, 1}n:
∣∣∣Rtrueµ (fp)−RempZh (fh)∣∣∣ ≤ 2
√
2
h log 2ehn + log
4
δ
n
+
4∑
i=1
θi.
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5. Tethered Hacking Intervals for Linear Regression
We develop hacking intervals in detail for two linear regression scenarios:
• Scenario 1: average treatment effect. We assume a class of linear functions F with p con-
founders and an indicator covariate for the treatment (1 if treatment, 0 if control). We write
f ∈ F as:
f(x, treated or control) = β1x.1 + β2x.2 + ...βpx.p + β01treated.
The goal is to construct a tethered hacking interval for β0, the coefficient of the treatment
indicator. In other words, the test statistic is t(Z, f) = β0. The coefficient β0 represents the
average treatment effect. Section 5.1 develops this in detail.
• Scenario 2: individual treatment effect. We assume a class of linear functions F with p
confounders for both the treatment and control groups. We write f ∈ F as:
f(x, treated or control) = 1control[βc1x.1 +β
c
2x.2 + ...β
c
px.p]+1treated[β
t
1x.1 +β
t
2x.2 + ...β
t
px.p],
where 1control is 1 only for the control group and 1treated is 1 only for the treatment group.
The goal is to construct a tethered hacking interval for a prediction of f on a new point
[x(new), treated or control]. In other words, the test statistic is t(Z, [x(new), treated or control], f) =
f(x(new), treated or control). The value f(x(new), treated or control) represents the prediction
for a person with covariates x(new). Section 5.2 develops this in detail.
In both scenarios we assume ignorability, we assume no unmeasured confounding, and we use a
quadratic loss functionL(Z, f) =
∑n
i=1
(
yi − f(xi, 1[i treated])
)2, where Z = {[xi, 1[i treated], yi]}ni=1
is the observed data. There are no hyperparameters so we suppress their notation in the loss function.
5.1 Scenario 1: Average Treatment Effect
The goal is to find the range of treatment effects, β0, corresponding to all possible ways the analyst
can hack the observed data subject to a constraint in the loss. Thus our goal is to solve:
max
β∈Rp,β0∈R
β0 s.t.
n∑
i=1
(
yi − βxi − β01[i treated]
)2 ≤ θ, (27)
and
min
β∈Rp,β0∈R
β0 s.t.
n∑
i=1
(
yi − βxi − β01[i treated]
)2 ≤ θ. (28)
This is a convex quadratically constrained linear program. Since there are inequality constraints
we require the full KKT conditions (the method of Lagrange multipliers does not handle inequality
constraints). As it turns out, answers to these problems can be found analytically. This is one of the
rare problems for which a subset of the KKT conditions can be used to find a closed form solution.
Theorem 1 (Hacking Interval for Least-Squares ATE) Define the following:
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• β∗LS := (X
TX)−1XTY, the optimal least square solution from regressing Y on X.
• β˜∗LS := (X˜
T X˜)−1X˜TY, the optimal least square solution from regressing Y on X˜ :=
[X,1[treated]]. The coefficient within this vector for the treatment variable is denoted β˜∗0,LS .
• γ∗LS := (X
TX)−1XT1[treated], the optimal least square solution from regressing 1[treated] on
X.
• Vtt :=
([
X˜T X˜
]−1)
tt
, the diagonal entry corresponding to the treatment variable of
[
X˜T X˜
]−1
.
Then, the solutions of the optimization problem (27) are:
β∗0,max = β˜
∗
0,LS +
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE, (29)
β∗max = β
∗
LS − β∗0,maxγ∗LS . (30)
and the solutions of the optimization problem (28) are:
β∗0,min = β˜
∗
0,LS −
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE, (31)
β∗min = β
∗
LS − β∗0,minγ∗LS . (32)
From this theorem, one can see that the range β∗0,max − β∗0,min scales as the square root of the
permitted level of optimality θ. The solution is not difficult to find if the relevant KKT conditions
are substituted into each other in a particular order.
Next, we relate the new confidence intervals to the standard ones and then produce new interpre-
tations for confidence intervals, based on in-sample error increases. In the process, we will discuss
possible meanings for the user-defined parameter θ.
5.1.1 RELATIONSHIP TO CLASSICAL CONFIDENCE INTERVALS.
We have just produced a confidence interval for β0. How does that compare with a typical con-
fidence interval produced using the standard approach where we assume a null distribution? The
confidence interval is symmetric in both cases around the least squares solution, so we must be able
to equate them. We next equate traditional confidence intervals with our confidence intervals, which
relates α for a significance test with θ for our robust confidence interval.
Theorem 2 (ATE Hacking Intervals and Standard Confidence Intervals) Start with a standard
confidence interval for β0 under usual assumptions (normality of errors given a linear model),
which is given by:[
β˜∗0,LS − t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
SSE
n− p− 1
√
Vtt, β˜
∗
0,LS + t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
SSE
n− p− 1
√
Vtt
]
(33)
where t(1−α/2),(n−p−1) is the 1−α/2 quantile of a t distribution with n− p− 1 degrees of freedom
(we estimate p coefficients plus the treatment variable). Then, in order to keep the new confidence
interval from Theorem 1 the same as the standard one, we would take the following value for θ:
θ = SSE
(
1 +
t2(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
n− p− 1
)
.
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Thus, for teaching purposes, rather than explaining the t distribution or the meaning of α to a student
unfamiliar with these topics, we can explain θ first and later convert to α for those who want this
interpretation.
5.1.2 NON-CLASSICAL CHOICES FOR θ.
In classical hypothesis testing, one would choose the significance level α and say that if the data
were drawn repeatedly from the true model, the probability that an estimated value of β0 would be
within the confidence interval with probability at least 1 − α. We propose in-sample alternatives
based on the meaning of θ. Here are some natural choices:
• Choose θ as a percentage of the SSE: Assume the user would not allow a model that would
achieve more than 10% higher error than the SSE. Then we set θ = 1.1 ·SSE. Generally if we
do not tolerate more than r% error higher than the SSE, we would choose θ = (1 + r)SSE.
To use this, we would ask questions like: “If we were to tolerate any type of change to the
data or model that would incur an additional error of 10%, what are the largest and smallest
treatment effect one could estimate?” If the answer is that the treatment effect estimate is
robust to 10% error due to user hacking, then the estimate is reliable.
• Choose θ as the minimum loss suffered to allow the treatment effect coefficient to be 0. Let us
say without loss of generality that the estimated treatment effect coefficient is negative. Then
the upper confidence interval is (using Theorem 1):
β∗0,max = β
∗
0,LS +
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE,
We can set this value to 0, which would provide the minimum sacrifice in least square error
necessary for that coefficient to become 0. We thus need to solve for θ0 in the following:
0 = β∗0,LS +
√
Vtt
√
θ0 − SSE,
θ0 =
(β∗0,LS)
2
Vtt
+ SSE.
In other words, we would need to sacrifice a least square error of at least
(β∗0,LS)
2
Vtt
beyond that
of the optimal solution in order that the regression coefficient could be 0.
To use this, we would ask questions like: “How much loss would need to be sacrificed in
order for the treatment to have the opposite estimated effect?”
5.1.3 COMBINING WITH DATA VARIANCE
The bounds of a the hacking interval, β∗0,max and β∗0,min, are deterministic functions of a fixed dataset
[X˜,Y]. If we assume the outcomes Y are one possible realization of a ground truth linear process
given by:
Y ∼ N(X˜β, σ2I), (34)
then the bounds of the hacking interval are random variables. The following theorem gives their
variance.
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Theorem 3 (Variance of Least-Squares ATE Hacking Interval Bounds) If outcomes Y are gen-
erated by equation 34 and the threshold θ is set to (1 + r)SSE for any r > 0, then the variance of
both hacking interval bounds β∗0,min and β
∗
0,max given by Equations (31) and (29), respectively, is:
V
[
β∗0,min | X˜
]
= V
[
β∗0,max | X˜
]
= σ2Vtt
(
1 + r(n− p− 1− µ2)) , (35)
where
µ =
( √
2Γ((n− p)/2)
Γ((n− p− 1)/2)
)
. (36)
5.1.4 ILLUSTRATION
Let us consider an illustrative example. We suppose a ground truth with two covariates called v·1
and v·2, chosen uniformly and independently over the interval [1,5], a 1/2 probability of treatment
assignment for each observation, and outcomes generated by the following process:
yi = 2× 1[treated] + vi1 + vi2 + i, (37)
where i ∼ N(0, 1). In this illustration, the researcher observes more than vi1, vi2, and the treat-
ment indicator, 1[i treated]. We assume they observe monomials xi = (vi1, vi2, v2i1, v
2
i2, vi1vi2,
vi1v
2
i2, v
2
i1vi2, v
2
i1v
2
i2) and 1[i treated]. In the language of Section 4.3, {[vi1, vi2, 1[i treated], yi]}ni=1 is
the pristine data and {[xi, 1[i treated], yi]}ni=1 is the observed data. This puts the researcher at risk of
overfitting the observed covariates in xi that are not part of the ground truth.
We simulated a dataset of n = 500 observations and used Theorem 1 to find the values of β∗max,
β∗0,max, β∗min, and β
∗
0,min, where θ was set to 10% higher than the least squares loss of β
∗
LS . Table 2
gives the results for the coefficient on treatment indicator, β0. To illustrate these results, on a grid of
vnew·1 and v
new
·2 , we found the vector of monomials that would be observed by the researcher, x
(new),
and evaluated the four possible outcome predictions (max and min, treatment and control):
yˆmax,treated = x
(new)β∗max + 1× β∗0,max (38)
yˆmin,treated = x
(new)β∗min + 1× β∗0,min (39)
yˆmin,untreated = x
(new)β∗min + 0× β∗0,min (40)
yˆmax,untreated = x
(new)β∗max + 0× β∗0,max. (41)
Equations (38) through (41) are ordered by value, from largest to smallest. This gives four surface
plots, shown in Figure 6 from different rotations. Asymptotically, or if we had a larger number of
points, the curves would be hyperplanes since the ground truth in Equation (37) depends linearly
on v·1 and v·2. As it stands, the curves are very close to the optimal hyperplanes, overfitting only
slightly.
We would like to consider individual treatment effects, where the treatment effects can differ
between units. The simple regression setting above will predict a constant treatment effect for all
units, so we need to have a more flexible modeling approach.
5.2 Scenario 2: Individual Treatment Effect
For the second regression scenario we consider, the regression model is more flexible, including
separate terms for treatment and control. Our goal is to find the range of treatment effects for a
particular point x(new).
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All four treatment prediction curves.
Prediction curves that yield maximum treatment effect.
Prediction curves that yield minimum treatment effect.
Figure 6: For all rows, the left and right figures are two different vantage points of the same figure.
Since the true data generation process in Equation (37) depends linearly on only v·1 and v·1, the
optimal prediction curve as a function of v·1 and v·1 is a hyperplane. The addition of monomials
to the observed x causes some overfitting. (Top Row) All four prediction curves (max/min, treat-
ment/control). (Second Row) Prediction curves that yield the maximum treatment effect. The upper
curve shows yˆmax,treated and the lower curve shows yˆmax,untreated. The difference between the curves
is the maximum treatment effect, β∗0,max. These curves correspond to the top and bottom curves in
the top row of plots. (Third Row) Prediction curves that yield the minimum treatment effect. The
upper curve shows yˆmin,treated and the lower curve shows yˆmin,untreated. The difference between the
curves is the minimum treatment effect, β∗0,min. These curves correspond to the middle two curves
in the top row of plots. 31
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β∗0,min β
∗
0,LS β
∗
0,max
1.52 2.16 2.80
Table 2: Minimum, least-squares, and maximum coefficient on the treatment indicator.
[β∗0,min, β
∗
0,max] is the tethered hacking interval. The ground truth is β0 = 2.
To explain the motivation for this problem, let us consider a new patient receiving a prediction
of the expected treatment effect for a drug. Before taking the drug, the patient might want to
know whether there are other reasonable models that give different predictions. That is, the patient
might want to know the answer to the following: Considering all reasonable models for predicting
treatment effects, what are the largest and smallest possible predicted treatment effects for this drug
on me?
To determine the range, we solve:
max
β,β0
f
(
x(new)
)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(
f(x
(new)
i )− y(new)i
)2 ≤ θ.
and
min
β,β0
f
(
x(new)
)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(
f(x
(new)
i )− y(new)i
)2 ≤ θ.
The model is:
f(x, treated or control) = 1control[βc1x.1 + β
c
2x.2 + ...β
c
px.p] + 1treated[β
t
1x.1 + β
t
2x.2 + ...β
t
px.p].
Using notation wi = 1 for treatment points, and wi = 0 for control points, the least squares loss
thus decouples, leading to separate regression problems for the treatment and control points:
n∑
i=1
(f(xi, wi)− yi)2
=
∑
i:wi=1
(f(xi, 1)− yi)2 +
∑
i:wi=0
(f(xi, 0)− yi)2
=
∑
i:wi=1
(
[βc1xi1 + β
c
2xi2 + ...β
c
pxip]− yi
)2
+
∑
i:wi=0
(
[βt1xi1 + β
t
2xi2 + ...β
t
pxip]− yi
)2
.
Because the first sum involves only the control observations and control coefficients, and the second
sum involves only treatment observations and treatment coefficients, this decouples as two separate
regressions, one for the control group, and one for the treatment group. We will assume that the
user wants neither of the regressions to be too suboptimal, so we will have separate constraints θ
on the quality of each regression. We will find the maximum and minimum values for the control
regression and the treatment regressions (four values). All of these optimization problems are very
similar, so for simplicity, we solve the optimization problem on a generic regression problem, for
point x(new). Here x(new) does not need to be one of the training observations.
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Theorem 4 (Hacking Intervals for Least-Squares Individual TE) Consider the hacking interval
optimization problems:
max
β
(x(new)β) such that
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ)2 ≤ θ,
min
β
(x(new)β) such that
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ)2 ≤ θ.
Define β∗LS := (X
TX)−1XTY, define Υ = (XTX)−1x(new)T , which is a vector of size p, SSE =
‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖2, and
µ˜ =
√
θ − SSE
‖XΥ‖ .
The solutions to the optimization problems above are:
β∗+ = β
∗
LS − µ˜Υ, β∗− = β∗LS + µ˜Υ.
Theorem 5 (Individual TE Hacking Intervals and Standard Confidence Intervals) Start with a
standard confidence interval for x(new)β under usual assumptions (normality of errors given a lin-
ear model), which is given by the boundary points:
β∗LS ± t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
SSE
n− p− 1
√
x(new)(XTX)−1x(new)T
where t(1−α/2),(n−p−1) is the 1−α/2 quantile of a t distribution with n−p−1 degrees of freedom.
Then, in order to keep the hacking interval from Theorem 4 the same as the standard one, we would
take the following value for θ:
θ = SSE
(
1 +
t2(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
n− p− 1
)
.
We can use the result of Theorem 4 to determine the hacking interval, which in this case is the
range of causal effect estimates for x(new). Let us apply Theorem 4 to the treatment regression and
the control regression separately. We thus obtain βt∗+ , βt∗− , βc∗+ , and βc∗− . To find the maximum of
the causal effect estimate, use:
max
(
x(new)βt∗+ ,x
(new)βt∗−
)
−min
(
x(new)βc∗+ ,x
(new)βc∗−
)
.
To find the minimum of the causal effect estimate, use:
min
(
x(new)βt∗+ ,x
(new)βt∗−
)
−max
(
x(new)βc∗+ ,x
(new)βc∗−
)
.
5.2.1 ILLUSTRATION
We continue with the same data generation process we used in Section 5.1.4, where the ground truth
outcomes are created as follows:
yi = 2× 1[treated] + vi1 + vi2 + .
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We chose x(new) to be created from the point vnew1 = 3, v
new
2 = 2. Here we created four separate
regressions. One regression maximizes the expected outcome at x(new) for the treatment observa-
tions. Another regression minimizes the expected outcome at x(new) on the treatment observations.
Analogous regressions are created for the control observations. Figure 7 shows these regressions
explicitly for x(new) = {3, 2}. One can see the regressions starting to bend away from each other at
x(new) for the maximization problem, and bend towards each other for the minimization problem.
We placed a blue line between the curves at the point x(new).
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All four models: max and min at x(new) of regressions for treatment and control
Max of treatment and min of control at x(new). Vertical line drawn at x(new)
Min of treatment and max of control at x(new). Vertical line drawn at x(new)
Figure 7: For all rows, the left and right figures are two different vantage points of the same figure.
(Top Row) All four regressions (max/min, treatment/control). (Second Row) Maximizing the gap
between treatment and control at x(new). The upper curve is the regression for maximizing expected
outcomes on the treated at x(new). The lower curve is the regression for minimizing expected out-
comes on the control units at x(new). One can see how the curves pull away from each other at
x(new) to make the differences between treatment and control as large as possible. (Third Row)
Minimizing the gap between treatment and control at x(new). The upper curve is the regression for
minimizing outcomes on the treatment units at x(new). The lower curve is the regression for max-
imizing the control outcomes at x(new). Here the curves pull towards each other to minimize the
estimated treatment effect.
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6. Application: Recidivism Prediction
Understanding the potential impact of researcher choices on machine learning methods becomes es-
pecially important when issues of fairness are involved. Although there does not exist a widely ac-
cepted mathematical definition of fairness when assessing risk with machine learning (Berk, 2016),
if a machine learning method could reach opposing conclusions about a person or group of persons
were small adjustments to a dataset or hyperparameters made, then this could potentially under-
mine any definition of fairness (one could simply argue a negative decision to be unfair because an
equally good model exists that predicts the opposite). A hacking interval quantifies the degree to
which this can happen.
In the criminal justice system, algorithms are increasingly being used to make risk assessments
about defendants, for example their risk of failing to appear in court or reoffending. Clearly, issues
of fairness are involved. One such algorithm is COMPAS (or, Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions), created by Northpointe Inc. (now Equivant). COMPAS pro-
duces three decile scores that indicate the risk that a defendant will fail to reappear in court, reof-
fend, or violently reoffend. As of October 2017 it was used by 4 of 58 counties in California (Back
et al., 2017). It is a proprietary algorithm that bases its assessment on a questionnaire that is either
pulled from criminal records or answered by the defendant. The data gathered by the questionnaire
is not publicly available. ProPublica assembled COMPAS scores and other data — including crim-
inal history and demographic information — on more than 7,000 defendants in Broward County,
Florida, from 2013 through 2014 with the help of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office. Using the
same metric used by Northpointe — whether or not a defendant was charged with a crime within
two years of the COMPAS score calculation — ProPublica concluded that COMPAS was biased
against African Americans. For example, they found that of African American defendants who did
not reoffend, 45 percent were misclassified as higher risk, while of Caucasian defendants who did
not reoffend, only 23 percent were misclassified as higher risk (Angwin et al., 2016). Northpointe
has issued a rebuttal that argues a definition of fairness based on a false-positive rate is not appro-
priate in this case (Dieterich et al., 2016). Angelino et al. (2017) and Fisher et al. (2018) argued
that since African Americans tend to have longer criminal histories, then as long as criminal history
is permitted, COMPAS may depend only on criminal history and not race, which agrees with the
sentiment of other work on interpretable models for recidivism (Zeng et al., 2017).
In our analysis, we use the data collected by ProPublica, but our interest is not in comparing a
risk assessment score like COMPAS against a given definition of fairness. Rather, we are interested
in the impact that researcher choices could have on conclusions made about this dataset. In Section
6.1, we use the methods of Section 3.1.3 to assess the impact that a new feature created by the
researcher could have on inferences about the population, in this case the odds ratio of reoffending
and gender. This is an example of a prescriptively-constrained hacking interval since we explicitly
constraint researcher choices about the new feature. In Section 6.2, we use the methods of Section
4.1.1 to assess the impact of researcher choices on the predictions of a support vector machine
about individual defendants. This is an example of a tethered hacking interval since we constrain
researcher choices only through their impact on the loss function. For both applications we use the
following set of features:
• c_charge_degree_F: Binary indicator if the most recent charge prior to the COMPAS score
calculation is a felony.
• sex_Male: Binary indicator if the defendant is male.
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• age_screening: Age in years at the time of the COMPAS score calculation.
• age_18_20, age_21_22, age_23_25, age_26_45, and age__45: Binary indicators based on
age_screening for age groups 18-20, 21-22, 23-25, 26-45, and greater than or equal to 45,
respectively.
• juvenile_felonies__0, juvenile_misdemeanors__0, and juvenile_crimes__0: Binary indicators
of whether there is more than one juvenile felony, misdemeanor, or crime, respectively. We
use binary indicators because the counts of each are highly right-skewed.
• priors__0, priors__1, priors_2_3, and priors__3: Binary indicators of whether the number of
priors is 0, 1, 2-3, or more than 3, respectively.
We filtered the dataset to include only defendants whose most recent charge prior to the COMPAS
score calculation was a felony or misdemeanor and occurred at most 30 days prior to the COMPAS
score calculation (otherwise we assume this charge did not trigger the COMPAS score calculation,
so it seems that data about this defendant are missing). The binary indicator variables for age and
number of priors were added to the dataset because, in general, recidivism is highly nonlinear with
respect to these features.
6.1 Prescriptively-Constrained Example: Adding a New Feature
We suppose a researcher is interested in the odds ratio between gender and recidivism but is allowed
to create a new binary feature u, perhaps as a function of the existing features or by introducing new
data. Notice this is not a valid causal question since gender is not assignable, but we only use the
mathematical tools of causal sensitivity analysis. A benefit of this approach is that we do not need
to understand exactly what the new feature is, only its relationship to the outcome y (whether or
not a defendant reoffends) and “treatment” w (gender). In the setup described in Section 3.1.3, this
means the researcher specifies constraints ORyu ∈ [a, b], |p1 − p0| ≤ c, and p0 ≥ d (by specifying
a, b, c and d), where p0 := p(U | w = 0), p1 := p(U | w = 1). We will use a simple version where
ORyu is fixed (or, equivalently, a = b = ORyu). As shown in Section 3.1.3, the hacking interval
can be calculated as a function of c.
Figure 8 shows hacking intervals for ORyw|xu — the odds ratio between recidivism and gen-
der adjusted for the observed covariates x and the new feature u — for each combination of
c ∈ (0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3) and ORyu ∈ (1.5, 1.75). These constraints are picked arbitrarily
for illustration. In practice, the choice of these constraints describes the degree of freedom given
to the researcher. For example, if the researcher were permitted to pick any new binary feature
u such that the odds ratio between the outcome and the new feature were ORyu = 1.5 and the
difference between p1 and p0 (the probability of the new feature when the treatment w is present
or not present, respectively) were constrained to be less than or equal to c = 0.3, then the value
of ORyw|xu they could get would necessarily be in the hacking interval [1.03, 1.37]. For the same
restriction of c = 0.3, if the researcher were permitted to pick u such that ORyu = 1.75, indicating
a stronger relationship between the new feature and the outcome, then they could obtain a value of
ORyw|xu above or below one, since Figure 8 shows the hacking interval in this case overlaps with
one. In other words, with this freedom given to the researcher, they could conclude that the odds
ratio between recidivism and gender, after controlling for measured covariates and the new covariate
they created, could be above or below one.
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Figure 8: Hacking intervals for ORyw|xu for different values of constraints c and a = b = ORyu.
6.2 Tethered Example: SVM
We now consider the impact of researcher hacking on predictions of two year recidivism for indi-
vidual defendants. We use a support vector machine (SVM) as our predictive model. For prediction
on a new defendant represented by x(new), SVM calculates the distance of x(new) to the hyperplane
that minimizes the hinge loss. If the distance is positive, the model predicts the defendant will
reoffend within two years. If the distance is negative, the model predicts the defendant will not
reoffend within two years. By adjusting the hyperplane, the tethered hacking interval is the range
of distances of x(new) to the hyperplane that can be achieved within a constraint on the loss. As
discussed in Section 4.1.1, we can find this range of values by solving the dual problem in Equation
(14) for s = −1 and s = 1. We do this using the fmincon function in MATLAB. We thus solved
two optimization problems for each defendant.
Figure 9 shows the hacking intervals for 10 selected defendants from each group of COMPAS
scores. We included a few individuals highlighted in an article by ProPublica (Angwin et al., 2016)
and randomly selected the rest. The loss is constrained to be within 5% of the minimum loss on a
group of 1000 defendants randomly selected from the remaining defendants (so, each prediction in
Figure 9 is out of sample).
Consider three possible cases: (i) The hacking interval is entirely below zero, (ii) the hacking
interval is entirely above zero, or (iii) the hacking interval overlaps with zero. In case (i), this means
there does not exist an SVM model such that the loss on the 1000 training observations is within 5%
of the minimum loss and the model predicts the defendant will reoffend; all “reasonable” models
(i.e., within this loss constraint) predict the defendant will not reoffend. In case (ii), when the
hacking interval is entirely above zero, the interpretation is the same except all reasonable models
predict the defendant will reoffend. In (iii), when the hacking interval overlaps with zero, then
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reasonable SVM models exist that make either prediction. Although this is only a sample of the
data, notice that of the ten defendants shown here with COMPAS scores of ten — the riskiest
possible COMPAS score — nine of them have hacking intervals that overlap with zero. On the
other hand, of the ten people shown here with COMPAS scores of one — the least risky COMPAS
score — five of them have hacking intervals entirely above zero.
In the ProPublica article (Angwin et al., 2016), several pairs of defendants are highlighted. For
each pair, one defendant received a low COMPAS score despite a significant criminal history, while
the other received a high COMPAS score despite a limited criminal history. For example, James
Rivelli and Robert Cannon were both charged with theft, but Rivelli was charged with felony grand
theft and possession of heroin, while Cannon was charged with misdemeanor petit theft. In addition,
Rivelli had three prior arrests, including for felony aggravated assault and felony grand theft, while
Cannon had none. Despite this, Rivelli — who is white — received a low risk COMPAS score of
three, while Cannon — who is black — received a medium risk COMPAS score of six. Rivelli
later reoffended in Broward County with grand theft again while Cannon did not. Interestingly, the
hacking intervals for both defendants overlapped with zero, indicating justifiable SVM models (on
our limited feature set) could have made either prediction. The hacking intervals also overlap with
zero for the similarly contrasting pair of Bernard Parker and Dylan Fugett, both arrested on drug
charges. For the pair of Vernon Prater and Brisha Borden, both arrested on petty theft charges, the
more experienced criminal Prater also has a hacking interval that overlaps with zero but we do not
have data on Borden. The exception is Mallory Williams, who received a medium risk COMPAS
score of six after a DUI arrest and only two prior misdemeanors. Her hacking interval is entirely
below zero, meaning no justifiable SVM model would predict she would reoffend in this experiment.
She did not reoffend. In general, we see a high degree of uncertainty from SVM models for the
individuals discussed in this article. The counterpart to Mallory Williams in the ProPublica article,
Gregory Lugo, illustrates how offense data can be easily misinterpreted. Gregory Lugo was charged
with a DUI but had zero priors according to the data we used in our analysis. Not surprisingly, his
COMPAS score was low and his hacking interval was entirely below zero. However, ProPublica
claimed he had four priors, including three DUIs, and used this as an example of a poorly calibrated
COMPAS score. This appears to be a misinterpretation of the data: all of his supposed prior offenses
have the same offense date as the offense related to his COMPAS score calculation, so the supposed
prior offenses appear to be re-recordings (perhaps for ordinary bureaucratic reasons) of the same
offense.
There are other interesting examples in Figure 9. Claudio Tamarez, a 30 year old Caucasian
male, received a COMPAS score of 4, which means low risk, following a charge for possession
of phentermine and despite 9 priors that included battery on officer. In contrast, his hacking in-
terval was entirely above zero. He ended up not recidivating within the 2 year follow-up period
though. Daniel Chiswell, a 41-year old (at the time of the COMPAS score calculation) Caucasian
male, was assigned a COMPAS score of only one despite being charged with felony possession of
heroin and having previously been charged with felony battery on an officer. His hacking interval
overlapped with zero, meaning there exists a reasonable SVM model that would have predicted he
would reoffend. He was charged again with felony possession of heroin later that year. Valentina
Parrish, a 21 year old Caucasian female, was charged with driving under the influence and posses-
sion of less than 20 grams of cannabis. She was given a COMPAS score of ten. In contrast, her
hacking interval, [−2.16, 0.50], also overlapped with zero but it was skewed towards the negative
end. She did not reoffend. There are also examples that illustrate limitations of our limited feature
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set. Victor Moreno, a 31 year old African American male, received a COMPAS score of 10 despite
zero priors. However, the arrest related to his COMPAS score calculation included felony charges
of battery, tampering with a victim, tampering with physical evidence, and delivering cocaine. Our
SVM model, without access to the content of these charges, not surprisingly gave him a low hacking
interval given his lack of prior offenses.
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Figure 9: SVM hacking intervals for 10 defendants for each COMPAS score. Loss is constrained to
be within 5% of the minimum loss on a random sample of 1000 defendants.
Figures 10 and 11 show the hacking intervals for every defendant in our dataset with COMPAS
scores of three and eight, respectively. The loss constraint is the same as above (within 5% of
the minimum loss on the same 1000 defendants). Of the 663 people in our dataset with COMPAS
scores of three — a “low risk” score — 75 of them had hacking intervals entirely above zero. Again,
this means that, had SVM been used for prediction, any reasonable model would have predicted that
they would reoffend. These 75 people had an average of about 6.3 priors and 35 of them reoffended.
Conversely, of the 428 people in our dataset with COMPAS scores of eight — a “high risk” score —
121 of them had hacking intervals entirely below zero, meaning any reasonable SVM model would
predict that they would not reoffend. These 121 people had an average of about 8.75 priors and 94
of them reoffended. This potentially means we may be missing data on their past criminal history
that is not in the dataset we use for our analysis. While it is possible that missing information can
explain COMPAS scores that are high, it cannot explain COMPAS scores that are too low.
We also show hacking intervals grouped by race in Figure 12. As before, we allow for a 5%
tolerance on the loss on a sample of 1000 defendants, but for this figure we use a different sample of
defendants. Each hacking interval in Figure 12 is out of sample (i.e., the defendant corresponding
to the hacking interval was not included in the 1000 defendant training sample used for the loss
constraint). Some of the COMPAS scores again do not align with the hacking intervals. Consider
Edwin Chaj, a 27 year-old Hispanic male with only one prior related to trespassing, received a
COMPAS score of nine following a charge of disorderly intoxication. In contrast to the high-risk
COMPAS score, his hacking interval was low ([−1.59, 0.24]), although not entirely below zero. He
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Figure 10: SVM hacking intervals for all defendants with a COMPAS score of 3. Loss is constrained
to be within 5% of the minimum loss on a random sample of 1000 defendants.
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Figure 11: SVM hacking intervals for all defendants with a COMPAS score of 8. Loss is constrained
to be within 5% of the minimum loss on a random sample of 1000 defendants.
did not reoffend. Similarly, Cuong Do, a 32 year old Asian male with no priors, received a COMPAS
score 8 following charges with felony burglary and misdemeanor petit theft. In contrast to the high-
risk COMPAS score, his hacking interval was entirely below zero. He did not recidivate. On the
other hand, consider Mories Abdo, a 27 year old Asian male with 6 priors, received a COMPAS
score of 3 following a battery charge. In contrast to the low-risk COMPAS score, his hacking
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interval was entirely above zero. He did not recidivate during the 2 year follow-up period, but did
commit felony Aggravated Assault with a Firearm just after the follow-up period ended, according
to the Broward County Clerk of the Courts.5 Figure 12 also indicates the individuals discussed in the
ProPublica article. Since the 1000-defendant training sample is different from Figure 9, the hacking
intervals are slightly different, but they are each in the same category (below zero, overlapping with
zero, or above zero).
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Figure 12: SVM hacking intervals for 10 randomly selected defendants for each race in the dataset
(except Native American as there are only 11 in the dataset). Loss is constrained to be within 5%
of the minimum loss on a random sample of 1000 defendants. Color indicates COMPAS scores
(high/medium/low).
We summarize Figures 9 through 12 with a couple observations:
• If we had used SVM on our limited data set rather than the COMPAS score to predict re-
offense, then for most people there is enough uncertainty in predictions that we could justi-
fiably predict either reoffend or not reoffend. This can be seen in Figures 10 and 11, where
75% and 67% of defendants with COMPAS scores of three and eight, respectively, have hack-
ing intervals that overlap with zero, meaning justifiable SVM models exist that could make
either prediction. Even for the extreme cases discussed in the ProPublica article, the hacking
intervals often overlapped with zero.
• There are many individuals for which no justifiable SVM model would agree with the COM-
PAS score using our feature set. In the case of an individual with a low COMPAS score, this
means their hacking interval is entirely above zero, while in the case of an individual with
a high COMPAS score, this means their hacking interval is entirely below zero. Figure 10
shows 75 examples of the former case and Figure 11 shows 121 examples of the latter case.
5. Mories Abdo also committed a Municipal Ordinance for Possession of a Controlled Substance during the two year
follow-up period, but this charge does not count as a reoffense in our dataset (there are many charges, like ordinary
traffic violations, that do not count as reoffenses).
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7. Related Work and Discussion
Hacking intervals are designed to quantify a form of uncertainty that is usually ignored in statistical
inference. This could have implications for scientific research; let us discuss this first.
PROBLEMS WITH REPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The evidence for p-hacking primarily comes from two types of meta-analyses: replication studies,
and the distribution of p-values for a set of independent findings (or “p-curve” Simonsohn et al.,
2014). For an example of the former approach, a major 2015 study attempted to replicate 100 stud-
ies and found very few findings could be reproduced (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), although
a replication of this replication found that the percent of studies that were replicated was not statis-
tically different from the fraction that would be expected to replicate due to chance alone (Gilbert
et al., 2016). Camerer et al. (2016) found a higher initial percentage being replicable in 18 economic
studies, but still reflecting a problem in the field. In commercial applications, large corporations are
keenly aware of this problem: based on their own comparisons, Bayer HealthCare found that only
about 20-25% of preclinical studies were completely in line with their in-house findings (Prinz et al.,
2011). Amgen replicated 11% of 53 scientific findings (Begley and Ellis, 2012).
For the p-curve approach, a uniform distribution of p-values across articles indicates a lack of
significant results, a right-skew indicates a general existence of significant results, and a left-skew,
especially near the 0.05 threshold, supposedly indicates p-hacking. Head et al. (2015) concluded
that the evidence indicates the existence of “widespread” evidence for p-hacking after searching all
Open Access papers in the PubMed database (~100,000 papers). This type of analysis has also been
contested (Bishop et al., 2016), and not all meta-analyses have found evidence of p-hacking (Jager
and Leek, 2014).
Several types of solutions to p-hacking have been proposed:
• We could require researchers to “pre-register” the details of their study, so that they cannot
selectively make choices to achieve significant results, but this rules out learning from the
data in any other way.
• Another proposal is to reduce the significance threshold (Monogan, 2015; Humphreys et al.,
2012; Simmons et al., 2011; Gelman and Loken, 2013), because when explicitly considering
multiple comparisons, decreasing the threshold for significance is sensible (e.g., the Bonfer-
roni correction). Recently, a group of 72 scientists advocated reducing it to 0.005 (Benjamin
et al., 2018), which might lessen false positives but would also invalidate the quantitative
meaning of the p-value in the first place. This is also a drastic measure, leading to a higher
true negative rate, and thus many important results being dismissed as insignificant.
• We could create Bayesian confidence intervals or Bayesian hierarchical models. In compar-
ison to frequentist hypothesis testing, Bayesian hypothesis testing provides a more comfort-
able interpretation of the conclusion (the probability that the alternative hypothesis is true),
but it is still subject to hacking: the introduction of a prior gives the researcher even more
discretion, which may lead to more user choices (see Gelman et al., 2012, for examples of
complicated priors leading to bias). If we place a prior on analysts’ decisions, it is easy to
argue that any given prior is wrong. An example of this, discussed earlier, is the choice of
matching algorithm for treatment and control units in a matched pairs experiment. This is a
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case where uniform priors do not make sense, but any other choice of prior is not defensible
either.
• In the case where the researcher does variable selection, post selection inference can be used
to adjust classical confidence intervals in order to account for the variables being chosen
after examining the data. In the case of linear regression, Tibshirani et al. (2016) present a
framework for specific variable selection procedures (forward stepwise regression, least angle
regression, and the lasso regularization path) and Berk et al. (2013) present a framework that
holds for all variable selection procedures that is more conservative than Scheffé protection
(Scheffé, 1959). Hacking intervals differ from post-selection inference in at least two ways:
(1) Hacking intervals are more general, as they could include uncertainty to many choices
made by the analyst for any prediction problem (not just regression), and do not necessarily
require i.i.d. Gaussian errors; (2) post selection is useful when you already have a model
selected and you want to do regular inference, whereas hacking intervals consider robustness
to other models that could have been selected. Post-selection confidence intervals can be
combined with hacking intervals to account for other researcher choices.
• The work of Dwork et al. (2015) provides a method to avoid p-hacking in a setting where data
are provided sequentially, chosen i.i.d. from the same distribution. Our setting is very differ-
ent; in our work, the data could be subject to pre-processing, and the underlying distribution
may not exist.
These solutions are obviously sometimes useful, but often unfulfilling, highlighting the importance,
inherent difficulty, and urgency of the problem.
PROBLEMS WITH CLASSICAL INFERENCE THAT ARE EASY TO OVERLOOK
Here we highlight some drawbacks to classical inference, including frequentist, Bayesian, and fidu-
cial inference (see Hannig et al. (2016) for a review of a modern version of fiducial inference), in
the way they are used in practice and how hacking intervals can help to fix these issues.
In cases where a superpopulation exists, the null hypothesis for data analysis is not the correct null
hypothesis. The entire confidence interval (CI) calculation for an observed dataset is conditional on
statistical assumptions about measurement, distributions, asymptotics, and modeling, among others.
Changes in any of these can greatly impact the resulting substantive conclusions, a problem known
as model dependence (King and Zeng, 2006; Iacus et al., 2011). The null hypothesis used for the
analysis depends on the processed data and thus is subject to model dependence. Let us say we want
to know whether a pharmaceutical drug causes a side effect. We might process data by choosing
covariates, choosing a match assignment, perform regression with a choice of regularization, and
so on. The “true" null hypothesis is that the drug does not have any side effect. Instead, the null
hypothesis that is actually tested is that the drug has no effect after the researcher’s pre-processing
is done to future instances of raw data. It is not clear which pre-processing steps will make the
researcher’s null hypothesis close to the true null hypothesis on the correct superpopulation. If the
researcher’s results are robust to a range of possible data processing options, then this range may
include processing that brings the data closer to a sample drawn from the true superpopulation.
To analyze the data in this case, we would want a combination of a hacking interval (for the data
processing choices) and a regular confidence interval (for the processed data) to ensure robustness
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both to user manipulation and to randomness in the sample of data. We discuss such combinations
in Section 5.1.3 for regression. To summarize, hacking intervals help to ensure that the conclusions
about the true null hypothesis with respect to the true superpopulation are valid.
It does not make sense to explicitly model analyst choices. In the case of Bayesian model averaging
or other decision-making frameworks, one might try to model the way the analyst might treat the
data and average over realistic choices an analyst might make. However, this makes little sense.
The hypothesis is about the ground truth, not about researcher choices. We would like the result to
be robust to any choices made by a reasonable researcher.
The example of matching, discussed earlier, is an example where placing a prior on analyst
choices of matching method does not make sense.
MATHEMATICAL EQUIVALENCE OF HACKING INTERVALS TO OTHER PROBLEMS, BUT WITH
DIFFERENT MEANING
In some contexts, hacking intervals bear mathematical equivalence to other problems, which means
we can leverage existing methods in some cases. Prescriptively-constrained hacking intervals often
fall under a form of sensitivity analysis (Leamer, 2010). If we consider uncertainty in the inputs to
a mathematical model (usually in an applied-math context), they fall under the field of Uncertainty
Quantification. If we consider uncertainty in prior specification, they fall under Robust Bayesian
Analysis. If we consider uncertainty in assumptions for causal inference, they fall under (causal)
Sensitivity Analysis. See Ghanem et al. (2017), Berger (1994), and Liu et al. (2013) for overviews
of these fields, respectively. Uncertainty Quantification provides useful computational tools, like
Monte-Carlo simulation and surrogate models (Sudret et al., 2017). In the latter two methods, the-
oretical bounds on effect estimates have been proven. Berger (1990) determines the range of a
posterior quantity priors contained in a certain class. In causal inference we can find the range
of effect estimates subject to an unmeasured confounder being within specified bounds on its re-
lationship to both the treatment and the outcome (Lin et al., 1998; Vanderweele and Arah, 2011).
If we think of an unmeasured confounder as an additional feature created by a researcher, we can
use these results to find the prescriptively-constrained hacking interval under this researcher degree
of freedom. We applied this idea in Section 3.1.3. Tethered hacking intervals are equivalent to
profile likelihood confidence intervals (Bjornstad, 1990) when the loss function corresponds to a
likelihood. We discussed this in more detain in Section 4.2.
Finding hacking intervals can be viewed as a form of robust optimization. Robust optimization
serves as a worst case analysis in decision theory. Uncertainty sets are the primitives for hacking
intervals, namely the ranges of user choices we are willing to consider. In prescriptively-constrained
hacking intervals, the uncertainty set is the range of prescriptive choices the researcher is allowed
to make. In tethered hacking intervals, the uncertainty set is determined by the set of functions
achieving low loss. If we cannot easily determine the uncertainty set in advance, we may be able
to learn the uncertainty sets from related problems if data (from other sources) are available. This
is done by Tulabandhula and Rudin (2014b) for machine learning to determine uncertainty sets for
decision making.
The “Machine Learning with Operational Costs” framework (Tulabandhula and Rudin, 2014a,
2013) computes a tethered hacking interval of the cost that a company might incur to enact an opti-
mal policy in response to any good predictive model. The work of Letham et al. (2016) uses tethered
hacking intervals in the setting of uncertainty quantification and optimal experimental design for dy-
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namical systems. They recommend to perform an experiment that would most reduce the hacking
interval on the quantity the experimenter wishes to estimate.
TEACHING OF HACKING INTERVALS
A major benefit of hacking intervals is that they are easy to explain. Confidence intervals and
p-values are difficult to teach and interpret, and are regularly misinterpreted. In response, the
American Statistical Association recently issued a document explaining hypothesis testing to users
(Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016), and the field of Basic and Applied Social Psychology banned p-
values altogether (Trafimow and Marks, 2015), but as the authors of these proposals recognize this
does not fully solve the problem.
Hacking intervals are easy to explain, do not require knowledge of probability to understand,
and sometimes capture as much, if not more, uncertainty as regular confidence intervals. Teaching
hacking intervals first may give a gentle introduction to the effect of uncertainty on conclusions.
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8. Conclusion
In this work, we presented an alternative theory of inference. It complements existing theories in
that it handles a form of uncertainty that arises from analyst choices, rather than from randomness
in the data. We presented several examples of hacking intervals stemming from regression and
classification, dimension reduction and feature selection. We showed in a real example how hacking
intervals can be helpful — in particular, our results indicate that a commonly used model for pre-
trial risk analysis may sometimes be incorrectly computed, potentially leading to suboptimal judicial
decision making throughout the U.S. Our examples indicate that is possible that these incorrectly
computed risk scores could lead (or have led) to dangerous criminals being released prior to trial.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof (Proposition 1: Hacking Intervals for SVM).
Notice that dual problem given by Equation (14) is convex. The last two terms are linear, 1/β
is convex, and the coefficient on this term is positive since it is a square. We will assume Slater’s
condition is satisfied. That is, that there exists a primal solution for which all inequality constraints
are strictly satisfied. In this case, the KKT conditions provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for optimality. We start by writing down the Lagrangian:
L(λ, λ0, ξ,α, r, β) = sλTx(new) + sλ0 −
n∑
i=1
αi
[
yi(λ
Txi + λ0)− 1 + ξi
]
−
n∑
i=1
riξi + β
[
1
2
‖λ‖22 + ψd
n∑
i=1
ξi − θ
]
,
where we have introduced dual variables {αi}ni=1, {ri}ni=1, and β.
Next, we check the KKT conditions:
• Lagrangian stationarity: 5L = 0. So, we have:
∂L
∂λ
= sx(new) −
n∑
i=1
α∗i yixi + β
∗λ∗ = 0
λ∗ =
1
β∗
(
−sx(new) +
n∑
i=1
α∗i yixi
)
, (42)
∂L
∂λ0
= s−
n∑
i=1
α∗i yi = 0 (43)
n∑
i=1
α∗i yi = s, (44)
∂L
∂ξi
= −α∗i − r∗i + β∗ψd = 0 (45)
r∗i = β
∗ψd − α∗i . (46)
• Complementary slackness: There are three conditions:
α∗i
[
yi(λ
∗Txi + λ∗0)− 1 + ξ∗i
]
= 0, ∀i (47)
r∗i ξ
∗
i = 0, ∀i (48)
β∗
[
1
2
‖λ∗‖22 + ψd
n∑
i=1
ξ∗i − θ
]
= 0.
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• Dual feasibility: There are three conditions:
α∗i ≥ 0, ∀i (49)
r∗i ≥ 0, ∀i
β∗ ≥ 0. (50)
Notice if we plug in the stationarity condition given by Equation (46), we have:
r∗i ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ β∗ψd − α∗i ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ α∗i ≤ β∗ψd. (51)
• Primal feasibility: There are three conditions:
yi(λ
∗Tx+ λ∗0)− 1 + ξ∗i ≥ 0, ∀i
ξ∗i ≥ 0, ∀i
1
2
‖λ∗‖22 + ψd
n∑
i=1
ξ∗i − θ ≤ 0.
Now, let us simplify the Lagrangian:
L(λ, λ0, ξ, α, r, β) = sλTx(new) + sλ0 − λ
∑
αiyixi − λ0
∑
αiyi
+
∑
αi −
∑
αiξi −
∑
riξi + β
[
1
2
‖λ‖22 + ψd
n∑
i=1
ξi − θ
]
= λT
(
sx(new) −
∑
αiyixi
)
+ λ0
{
s−
∑
αiyi
}
+
∑
αi +
∑
{−αi − ri + βψd}ξi + β 1
2
‖λ‖22 − βθ
= −βλT
{
1
β
(
−sx(new) +
∑
αiyixi
)}
+ λ0
{
s−
∑
αiyi
}
+
∑
αi +
∑
{−αi − ri + βψd}ξi + β 1
2
λTλ− βθ
Next we plug the KKT conditions (42), (43), and (45) into the Lagrangian:
L(λ∗, λ∗0, ξ∗,α∗, r∗, β∗) = −β∗λ∗T {λ∗}+ λ∗0{0}+
∑
α∗i +
∑
{0}ξ∗i + β∗
1
2
λ∗Tλ∗ − β∗θ
= −β 1
2
λ∗Tλ∗ +
∑
α∗i − β∗θ.
Plugging in Equation (42) we have:
L(λ∗, λ∗0, ξ∗,α∗, r∗, β∗)
= −β∗ 1
2
 1β∗
(
−sx(new) +
n∑
i=1
α∗i yixi
)T
1
β∗
(
−sx(new) +
n∑
i=1
α∗i yixi
)+∑α∗i − β∗θ
= − 1
2β∗
[
s2x(new)Tx(new) − 2s
∑
α∗i yix
T
i x
(new) + s2
∑
i
∑
k
α∗iα
∗
kyiykx
T
i xk
]
+
∑
α∗i − β∗θ
= − 1
2β∗
[
x(new)Tx(new) − 2s
∑
α∗i yix
T
i x
(new) +
∑
i
∑
k
α∗iα
∗
kyiykx
T
i xk
]
+
∑
α∗i − β∗θ.
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Notice s2 = 1, so we can eliminate it. Since the Lagrangian only depends on the dual variables α
and β, the dual problem is:
max
α,β
− 1
2β
[
x(new)Tx(new) − 2s
∑
αiyix
T
i x
(new) +
∑
i
∑
k
αiαkyiykx
T
i xk
]
+
∑
αi − βθ
s.t.

0 ≤ αi ≤ βψd, ∀i∑n
i=1 αiyi = s
β ≥ 0,
where the constraints come from Equations (49), (44), (50), and (51). Once the optimal (α∗, β∗)
have been found, we find the optimal λ∗ from Equation (42).
To find λ∗0 we can use the complementary slackness conditions. For some isv such that r∗isv > 0
and α∗isv > 0, we have ξ
∗
isv
= 0 and yisv(λ
∗Txisv +λ∗0)− 1 + ξ∗isv = 0, by Equations (47) and (48),
respectively. Then, yisv(λ
∗Txisv + λ∗0) = 1, so λ∗0 = yisv − λ∗Txisv .
Proof (Proposition 2: Generalization Bound for Hacked Data).
As a result of Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1981) and the Vapnik-Chervonenkis-Sauer-Shelah
lemma (proved independently by Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1971), Sauer (1972), and Shelah (1972)),
we have that with probability 1− δ:
∣∣∣Rtrueµ (fp)−RempZp (fp)∣∣∣ ≤ 2
√
2
h log 2ehn + log
4
δ
n
Applying the triangle inequality, Equation (8), the assumptions about θ1, θ2, and θ3, and the calcu-
lated θ4 gives: ∣∣∣Rtrueµ (fp)−RempZh (fh)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Rtrueµ (fp)−RempZp (fp)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣RempZp (fp)−RempZo (fp)∣∣∣
+
∣∣RempZo (fp)−RempZo (fo)∣∣
+
∣∣RempZo (fo)−RempZo (fh)∣∣
+
∣∣∣RempZo (fh)−RempZh (fh)∣∣∣
≤2
√
2
h log 2ehn + log
4
δ
n
+
4∑
i=1
θi.
Proof (Theorem 1: Hacking Interval for Least-Squares ATE).
Let us rewrite the problems as follows:
max /minβ∈Rp,β0∈Rβ0 such that g(β, β0)− θ ≤ 0,
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where g(β, β0) =
∑n
i=1
(
yi − βxi − β01[i treated]
)2.
Let us write some of the KKT stationarity conditions:
5β0 = µ5 g(β, β0).
In particular, we consider the gradients along the βj’s:
for j = 1 . . . p,
∂β0
∂βj
∣∣∣∣
β∗0 ,β∗
= 0,
∂g(β, β0)
∂βj
∣∣∣∣
β∗0 ,β∗
= −2
n∑
i=1
(
yi − xTi β∗ − β∗01[i treated ]
)
xij ,
that is:
0 = XTY −XTXβ∗ − β∗0XT1[treated]
and solving for β∗:
β∗ = (XTX)−1XTY − β∗0(XTX)−1XT1[treated]. (52)
Changing notation in (52),
β∗ = β∗LS − β∗0(XTX)−1XT1[treated], (53)
where β∗LS = (X
TX)−1XTY is the optimal least square solution. We do not yet know β∗0 , and for
that, we will use complementary slackness.
µg(β∗β∗0) = 0→ g(β∗β∗0) = 0, that is,
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ∗ − β∗01[i treated])2 − θ = 0. (54)
Equations (53) and (54) will suffice to find all solutions. Substituting (53) into (54),
0 =
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ∗LS − β∗0 [xi(XTX)−1XT1[treated] − 1[i treated]])2 − θ,
0 =
∑
i
(di + β
∗
0hi)
2 − θ,
where we have defined differences di := yi−xiβ∗LS and hi := xi(XTX)−1XT1[treated]−1[i treated].
Continuing,
0 =
(∑
i
d2i − θ
)
+ 2β∗0
(∑
i
hidi
)
+ β∗20
∑
i
h2i .
Thus, using the quadratic formula:
β∗0 =
−2∑i hidi ±√(2∑i hidi)2 − 4(∑i h2i ) ((∑i d2i )− θ)
2
∑
i h
2
i
= − h
Td
‖h‖2 ±
1
‖h‖
√
(hTd)2
‖h‖2 − ‖d‖
2 + θ.
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Now, suppose θ were set to the SSE. Then the contents of the square root must become 0, since if this
were not true, the solution to the robust optimization problem would disagree with the solution to the
least squares minimization problem in the case where θ is the SSE, which would be a contradiction.
In that case, we are back to the least square solution, which must be both β˜∗0,LS and − h
Td
‖h‖2 . Next,
setting the contents of the square root to 0 and solving for θ (which was set to the SSE), we find
θ = ‖d‖2 − (hTd)2‖h‖2 . Putting this together we have:
β∗0 = β
∗
LS ±
1
‖h‖
√
θ − SSE. (55)
Notice we can write Vtt, the diagonal entry corresponding to the treatment variable of
[
X˜T X˜
]−1
,
as follows:
Vtt :=
([
X˜T X˜
]−1)
tt
=
([[
XT
1Ttreated
] [
X 1treated
]]−1)
tt
=
([
XTX XT1treated
(XT1treated)
T 1Ttreated1treated)
]−1)
tt
=
[(
XTX
)−1
+ 1k
(
XTX
)−1
XT1treated1
T
treatedX
(
XTX
)−1 1
k
(
XTX
)−1
XT1treated
1
k1
T
treatedX
(
XTX
)−1 1
k
]
tt
(56)
=
1
k
, (57)
where k = 1Ttreated1treated−1TtreatedX
(
XTX
)−1
XT1treated = 1
T
treated(In−H)1treated, H = X
(
XTX
)−1
XT
is the hat matrix, and In is an identity matrix of size n. Equation (56) follows from a common block
matrix inversion formula (see Proposition 2.8.7 in Bernstein (2005), for example). Next, notice that
‖h‖2 simplifies to:
hTh = −1treatedX(XTX)−1XT1treated + 1Ttreated1treated
= 1Ttreated(In −X(XTX)−1XT )1treated
= 1Ttreated(In −H)1treated
, = k (58)
Therefore, from Equations (57) and (58), we have Vtt = 1/‖h‖2. Plugging this result into Equation
(55) we have the desired result for β0,max and β0,min:
β∗0,max = β˜
∗
0,LS +
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE
β∗0,min = β˜
∗
0,LS −
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE.
Finally, defining γ∗LS := (X
TX)−1XT1[treated] as the optimal least square solution from regressing
1[treated] on X, from Equation (53) we have:
β∗max = β
∗
LS − β∗0,maxγ∗LS ,
β∗min = β
∗
LS − β∗0,minγ∗LS .
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Proof (Theorem 2: ATE Hacking Intervals and Standard Confidence Intervals).
Equating the upper bound of the least-squares ATE hacking interval β∗0,max to the upper bound
of a standard confidence interval, given in Equations (29) and (33), respectively, and solving for θ
we have: √
Vtt
√
θ − SSE = t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
SSE
n− p− 1
√
Vtt
θ = SSE
(
1 +
t2(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
n− p− 1
)
.
The calculation is the same for the lower bounds of the two intervals.
Proof (Theorem 3: Variance of Least-Squares ATE Hacking Interval Bounds).
Let β∗0,s = β˜∗0,LS + s
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE, where s = 1 gives β∗0,max and s = −1 gives β∗0,min as
defined by Equations (31) and (29), respectively. It is well-known that for linear regression, the
maximum likelihood estimates β˜LS = (X˜′X˜)−1X˜TY and σ˜2LS =
1
n(Y − X˜β˜LS)T (Y − X˜β˜LS)
for β and σ2, respectively, have the following properties:
• Property 1: β˜LS ∼ N(β, (X˜T X˜)−1σ2).
• Property 2: nσ˜
2
LS
σ2
= SSE
σ2
∼ χ2n−p−1. Consequently,
√
SSE/σ has a has a chi distribution
with mean µ given by Equation (36) for n− p− 1 degrees of freedom.
• Property 3: β˜LS and σ˜2LS are independent conditional on X˜. Consequently, β˜
∗
0,LS and
s
√
rVtt
√
nσ˜2LS = s
√
rVtt
√
SSE are also independent for fixed X˜.
Therefore:
V
[
β∗0,s | X˜
]
= V
[
β˜∗0,LS + s
√
Vtt
√
θ − SSE | X˜
]
= V
[
β˜∗0,LS + s
√
Vtt
√
(1 + r)SSE− SSE | X˜
]
= V
[
β˜∗0,LS + s
√
rVtt
√
SSE | X˜
]
= V
[
β˜∗0,LS
]
+ V
[
s
√
rVtt
√
SSE | X˜
]
(59)
= σ2Vtt + s
2rVttV
[√
SSE | X˜
]
(60)
= σ2Vtt + rσ
2VttV
[√
SSE/σ2 | X˜
]
= σ2Vtt + rVtt(n− p− 1− µ2) (61)
= σ2Vtt
(
1 + r(n− p− 1− µ2)) ,
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where µ is given by Equation (36). Equation (59) follows from Property 3, the first term in Equa-
tion (60) follows from Property 1, and Equation (61) follows from the variance formula for a chi
distribution. Notice the final result does not depend on s, so it holds for both β∗0,max and β∗0,min.
Proof (Theorem 4: Hacking Intervals for Least-Squares Individual TE).
Starting again with the stationarity conditions:
5(x(new)β) = µ5
[
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ)2 − θ
]
,
evaluating the gradients with respect to βj , we know that the optimal solution β∗ obeys
x(new)j = 2µ
[∑
i
(yi − xiβ∗)(−xij)
]
and the full gradients in vector form are:
x(new) = 2µ(XTXβ∗ −XTY),
Solving for β,
β∗ =
1
2µ
[
(XTX)−1x(new)T
]
+ (XTX)−1XTY = µ˜Υ + β∗LS
where β∗LS is the optimal least squares solution, (X
TX)−1XTY, we defined µ˜ = 1/(2µ), and
Υ = (XTX)−1x(new). Again using complementary slackness,
µ
(
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ∗)2 − θ
)
= 0→
(
n∑
i=1
(yi − xiβ∗)2 − θ
)
= 0.
Substituting from (62),
n∑
i=1
(yi − µ˜xiΥ− xiβ∗LS)2 − θ = 0, and simplifying yields
,
0 =
[∑
i
(yi − xiβ∗LS)2 − θ
]
− 2µ˜
∑
i
(xiΥ)(yi − xiβ∗LS) + µ˜2
∑
i
(xiΥ)
2
0 =
[∑
i
(yi − xiβ∗LS)2 − θ
]
− 2µ˜V + µ˜2
∑
i
(xiΥ)
2,
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where we let V =
∑
i(xiΥ)(yi − xiβ∗LS). Notice it is equal to zero:
V =
∑
i
(xiΥ)(yi − xiβ∗LS)
= (XΥ)T (Y −Xβ∗LS)
= (X(XTX)−1x(new)T)T (Y −Xβ∗LS)
= (x(new)(XTX)−1XT )(Y −Xβ∗LS)
= x(new)(XTX)−1XTY − x(new)(XTX)−1(XTX)β∗LS
= x(new)β∗LS − x(new)β∗LS
= 0.
Therefore, the quadratic formula yields:
µ˜ =
±
√
−4 (∑i(xiΥ)2) [∑i(yi − xiβ∗LS)2 − θ]
2
∑
i(xiΥ)
2
.
Simplifying, abusing notation by letting µ˜ be the positive solution, and plugging these solutions
back into (62) yields the result:
β∗+ = β
∗
LS − µ˜Υ, β∗− = β∗LS + µ˜Υ.
Proof (Theorem 5: Individual TE Hacking Intervals and Standard Confidence Intervals).
The boundary points of a standard confidence interval are:
x(new)β∗LS ± t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
MSE(x(new)(XTX)−1x(new)T )
x(new)β∗LS ± t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
SSE/(n− p− 1)
√
x(new)Υ
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By Theorem 4, the boundary points of the robust interval are:
x(new)β∗LS ± µ˜x(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖
‖XΥ‖ x
(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖√
(XΥ)T (XΥ)
x(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖√
(X(XTX)−1x(new)T )T (X(XTX)−1x(new)T )
x(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖√
x(new)(XTX)−1x(new)T
x(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖√
x(new)Υ
x(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖
√
x(new)Υ
x(new)β∗LS ±
√
θ − SSE
√
x(new)Υ.
Comparing the standard and robust confidence intervals, we have:
t(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
√
SSE/(n− p− 1) =
√
θ − ‖Y −Xβ∗LS‖
θ = SSE
(
1 +
t2(1−α/2),(n−p−1)
n− p− 1
)
.
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